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ABSTRACT
The first essay studies the long term trend of internal migration in the United
States. Over the last forty years, there has only been a modest change in the over-
all interstate migration rate in the United States. However, different demographic
groups have seen very different patterns of changes. The migration rate for fami-
lies with two college graduate spouses dropped from 5.66% in 1965-1970 to 2.82% in
2000-2005. As for the families with college-graduate husband, it dropped from 4.05%
to 2.15% during the same time frame. Interstate migration rates for other types of
families or singles have seen little change. This paper extends Mincer’s family migra-
tion model into a search framework and directly estimates the effects of female labor
force participation, spousal earning ratio, correlation of earnings from job offers, and
home ownership on the migration propensity by using the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) data in the period of 1982-2005. Endogeniety issues of these variables
are appropriately addressed. According to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition anal-
ysis, we find that the increasing female labor force participation rate and earning
ratio of wife to husband are the primary determinants for the decline in the inter-
state migration rate of families with two college-graduate spouses and families with
a college-graduate husband in the 1980s-1990s. The rising home ownership accounts
for a large portion of the decrease in the migration rate of highly educated families,
in the 1990s-2000s.
The second essay studies the impact of changing youth cohort size on the un-
employment rate. Although an increase in youth cohort size is often found to exert
an upward pressure on the aggregate unemployment rate, it has been provided some
ii
empirical evidences and a theoretical model to the contrary. We find that the esti-
mated elasticity of unemployment rate is quite sensitive in a fixed effect model, with
the inclusion of year dummies, when there is a strong temporal correlation between
the youth cohort size and the unemployment rate. Both the sign and magnitude of
the estimates vary significantly when using data from different time periods. We pro-
pose an alternative way to control for the fixed effects and obtain consistent estimates
across the time periods in the United States. Our results support the conventional
wisdom of positive correlation between youth cohort size and aggregate unemploy-
ment rate. This positive effect of the youth cohort size is strongest for the youngest
workers and gradually diminishes for older workers, which implies that the young
and the prime age workers are not perfect substitutes to the employers.
iii
To Evan
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First of all, I am grateful to Texas A&M University for having me in the Economic
PhD program, from which I have gained so much knowledge and research experience
in the study of Economics.
I wish to express my sincere thanks to my advisor, Dr. Li Gan, for his caring,
patience, and excellent guidance toward the completeness of my thesis. I also thank
all my committee members-Dr. Steven Puller, Dr. Jonathan Meer, and Dr. Joanna
Lahey- who provide me valuable guidance and suggestions.
I thank my parents for their unceasing encouragement and unconditional love
forever. I would never have been able to finish my dissertation without the support
and help from my husband Shuai Yang. He is always there cheering me up and stand
by me through the good times and bad.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The Slowdown of Family Migration in the United States . . . . . . . 1
1.2 “Cohort Crowding Effect” of Youth Share on Unemployment Rate . . 4
2. THE SLOW DOWN OF FAMILY MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7
2.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 The Trend of Migration Rate in the United States . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Migration, Education, Home Ownership and Family Ties . . . 8
2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Trends in the Interstate Migration Rate in the United States . . . . . 14
2.4 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.1 Home Ownership Prior to Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.2 Correlation in the Earnings Between Wife and Husband . . . 33
2.5.3 Wife’s Labor Force Participation and Wife-Husband Earning
Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.4 Empirical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 Accounting for Changes in the Family Migration Rate . . . . . . . . . 47
3. YOUTH COHORT SIZE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
vi
3.2 Temporal Correlation between Unemployment Rate and Youth Cohort
Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.1 The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Unemployment Rate in
the U.S. and OECD: A Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.2 Conditional and Unconditional Marginal Effect of Youth Co-
hort Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.1 Empirical Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.2 Cross Sectional Evidence for the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.3 Results after Controlling for State Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . 80
3.4.4 Inference from OECD Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4.5 Robust Checks by Using Micro Data in the U.S. . . . . . . . . 90
4. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.1 The Slowdown of Family Migration in the United States . . . . . . . 94
4.2 “Cohort Crowding Effect” of Youth Share on Unemployment Rate . . 96
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
2.1 Interstate Migration by Demographic Groups (1964-2005). . . . . . . 15
2.2 Interstate Migration by Family Types (1964-2005). . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Accounting Analysis of the Change in Migration Rate (1964-2005). . 22
2.4 The Mean Values of the Explanatory Variables over the Decades of
1980, 1990, and 2000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1 The Trend of Unemployment Rate, Youth Share and Oil Price in the
U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 The Trend of Unemployment Rate and Youth Share in the OECD
Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Correlation between State Average of Unemployment Rate and Youth
Share in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Correlation between State Average of Unemployment Rate and Youth
Share in the U.S.-Exclude outliers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 State Average of Unemployment rate and Youth Share by Age Group
in the U.S. in 1978-1996 - Excluding Outliers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.6 State Average of Unemployment Rate and Youth Share by Age Group
in the U.S. in 1997-2008 - Excluding Outliers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.7 Distributions of the OLS Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Aggregate Unemployment Rate in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.8 Distributions of the OLS Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1978-1996. 82
3.9 Distributions of the OLS Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1997-2008 83
3.10 Distributions of the IV Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Aggregate Unemployment Rate in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.11 Distributions of the IV estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1978-1996. 85
viii
3.12 Distributions of the IV Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1997-2008. 86
ix
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
2.1 Employment Status and Migration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Occupation Record and Employment Status in the CPS (1982-2006). 36
2.3 Logit Regression for Probability of Migrating Across States (1982-2006). 43
2.4 Logit Regression for Probability of Migrating Across States-Two Col-
lege Graduates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Logit Regression for Probability of Migrating Across States-College
Husband. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.6 Predicted Changes in Migration Rate-by Family Type. . . . . . . . . 50
2.7 Predicted Changes in Migration Rate-Families with Two College Grad-
uates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.8 Predicted Changes in Migration Rate-Families with College Husband. 55
3.1 The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Unemployment Rate in the U.S.,
1978-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Unemployment Rate in OECD
Countries, 1971-2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 The Impact of Youth Cohort Size in Different Model Specifications in
the U.S., 1978-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 The Impact of Youth Cohort Size in Different Model Specifications in
OECD Counties, 1971-2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Cross-Sectional Analysis for U.S. in 1978-1996. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis for U.S. in 1997-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 The Distribution of the Estimates from the Pseudo Panel in the U.S.,
1978-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.8 Effects of Youth Cohort Size on the Labor Force Participation and
Unemployment Probability -U.S. Census 1970-2000. . . . . . . . . . . 92
x
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Slowdown of Family Migration in the United States
The U.S. population is known for its high geographic mobility.1 However, com-
pared with earlier generations, Americans are now less mobile. Over the last forty
years, before the current recession, the interstate migration rate in the United States
has been modestly slowing down from 3.76% in 1965-1970 to 2.76% in 2000-2005.2
The decrease in the migration rate, however, is far from homogeneous across dif-
ferent demographic groups. Power couples, defined as the couples with two college
graduates, have seen the greatest drop in their migration propensity from 5.66% in
1965-1970 to 2.82% in 2000-2005. Couples with college-graduate husband also wit-
ness a great decrease in their interstate migration rate from 4.05% to 2.15% during
the same time frame. In contrast, singles, couples with a college-graduate wife, and
couples with two high school graduates have seen little change in their migration
1Throughout section 2, we only focus on the interstate migration, because we are focused on
job-related geographic migration. Since 1999, the CPS shows that over one-half of the migrations
within counties are due to housing-related reasons, such as purchasing or upgrading a house. Less
than 10% migrants report they migrate for jobs. In contrast, for interstate migrants, the percentage
of housing-related reasons drops to about one-fifth while the percentage of job-related reasons rises
to one-third (Frey 2009). Therefore, the intercounty migration is of less interest since these movers
are more likely to move cross the relevant political boundaries but remain in the same labor market
(Greenwood 1997). Metropolitan area could be regarded as a good approximation of a local labor
market. However there are several drawbacks to define migrations based on metropolitan areas.
First, many datasets provide the location information to the county or state level. One may try to
aggregate the county level variable to a metropolitan area level. However, the boundaries of the
metropolitan areas are not fixed in a long period since the subdivisions of metropolitan areas are
revised every few years in order to reflect the varying local social and economic factors. Measuring
migrations consistently in a relatively long time period is impossible. Second, metropolitan areas do
not cover the entire country. According to the definition by the Office of Management and Budget,
a metropolitan area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population, and a micropolitan
area contains an urban core of population between 10,000 and 50,000. If the origin and destination
of the migration are defined base on metropolitan area, migration from less urban areas to metro
areas, then the population flows between less urban areas will not be counted.
2These rates are directly calculated from the CPS. They are averaged for a 5 years interval. The
data used for this statistics include working age people with age between 16 and 64.
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propensities. Meanwhile, the share of couples with at least one college graduate in
the population has been increasing steadily over the years. Since the migration rates
of the college-graduate couples are much higher than the rates of other couples, the
dramatic decrease in the migration propensity of the highly educated couples only
translates to a modest decrease in the overall migration rate.
In Section 2, two basic explanations are explored for the declining migration 
propensities of married couples with college backgrounds. The first explanation 
links the falling migration propensity to a set of factors related to the labor market. 
These factors include the female labor force participation, earning ratio of wife to 
husband, and the correlation of gains from migration between spouses. The second 
explanation is related to the changes in home ownership rates. We extend Mincer’s 
[1978] family migration model into a search framework. The extension allows us to 
formally model and estimate the joint effects of these determinants on the family mi-
gration propensities. We also propose a method to directly measure the correlation 
of the gains from the migration of the two spouses.
In the past four decades, both the female labor force participation rate and their
earnings increase significantly. Therefore, the earning ratio of wife to husband in-
creases over time as well. In general, the family migration decision is initiated by the
husband’s job changes, opportunity cost in the couples of dual workers will increase
when the wife’s earnings account for a larger portion in the family income. The
correlation of the earnings from job offers between spouses may also be important
in determining migration propensity. A lower correlation reduces the probability of
receiving job offers that are beneficial for the whole family.
In the second explanation, we consider the effect of changing home ownership
on migration. The average home ownership rate in the Unites States increases from
62% in 1960 to 68% in 2000 according to the U.S. Census data. The home ownership
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rate also displays different trends among different types of families. Home ownership
is endogenously related to the migration decision, because it is difficult to determine
whether owners are unlikely to move, or movers do not like to own since they an-
ticipate they are going to move. The estimated influences of the home ownership
on the migration propensity will be biased if we directly use the home ownership
observed in the data. To overcome this endogeneity, we predict the home ownership
status by employing the state averages of home value, per-capita income, property
tax rates, mortgage rates and their interactions with some of the observed personal
characteristics.
By drawing data from the CPS over the 1982-2005 period, we first test the de-
terrent effects of the labor market variables and home ownership on the migration
propensity in a logit model. Then a variation of the Blinder-Oaxaca technique, de-
veloped by Fairlie was adopted to investigate the contributions of these changing
factors in explaining the decreasing family migration, particularly for the families
with two college graduates and a college-graduate husband. The decomposition anal-
ysis reveals that over the decades from 1980s to 1990s, increasing female labor force
participation and the earning ratio between wife and husband accounts for about
60% of the decline in the migration rate for families with two college graduates. The
correlation of earnings from new job offers only explains a small part of the slowdown
in the migration in this period. Increasing home ownership is primarily responsible
for the decline of migration rate for these families during the period of 1990s-2000s.
Similar results are obtained for families with a college-graduate husband. In addition
to these determinants, the changing age structure of the population also contributes
to the declining migration rate over the three decades in our sample period. The
average age of the family head is increasing steadily due to the aging of baby boom
generation.
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In section 2, we first provide the related literature. Section 2.2 introduces the
data set. Section 2.3 presents the trends of aggregate interstate migration rate and
family migration rate in the United States. Section 2.4 develops our theoretical
framework which serves as a guidance in the empirical analysis. Section 2.5 discusses
the empirical strategies and outlines the results. Section 2.6 presents the accounting
study for the changes in the family migration rate. A conclusion is given in Section
4.1.
1.2 “Cohort Crowding Effect” of Youth Share on Unemployment Rate
The unemployment rate of young workers, defined as those aged between 16 and
24, is higher than that of the prime age workers aged between 25 and 64. Therefore,
as the share of youth in the population increases, the overall unemployment rate may
also increase, a so-called ”cohort crowding” effect. Korenman and Neumark [2000]
confirm the cohort crowding effect by using a panel of 15 OECD countries in the
period of 1970–1994, supporting the literature based on the time series analysis. To
the contrary, by using U.S. state data from 1978-1996, Shimer [2001] provides some
empirical evidences and a theoretical model that prove otherwise. He finds that the
effect of youth cohort size on the unemployment rate is significantly negative.
This study contributes to the literature by proposing an explanation to this con-
tradictory empirical evidence. First, we find even more contradictory evidences if
using data from different time periods. The estimates obtained by using the US
state panel from 1997 to 2008 are negative, contradictory to the results using the
panel from 1978-1996. The estimates from the OECD 1995-2009 panel are mostly
positive but insignificant, different from the results using the 1970-1994 panel. We
argue that the reason for these inconsistencies is the strong temporal correlation of
youth cohort size due to the baby boom and the historical trend of unemployment
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rates.
The baby boom after World War II is one of the most important demographic
phonomena over the last half century. During the period of 1970s to mid 1990s, the
youth cohort size has seen a sharp decline for both the US and the OECD countries.
In the meantime, the overall unemployment rate in the US has a decreasing trend in
the US but increasing trend in the OECD countries, creating a strong and dominating
temporal relationship between the youth cohort size and the unemployment rate.
After mid 1990s, the trend in the youth cohort size disappears, and the temporal
correlation no longer plays an important role.
Essentially, the temporal correlations in the unemployment rate and youth share
in either the U.S. or the OECD countries are due to the baby boom. Without the
baby boom, temporal variation of the youth cohort size would be small and there is
no long-run trend of the youth cohort size across so many years. However, the baby
boom is a not a historical normality. The estimates obtained from the conditional
model in a certain time period, by controlling for the year effects, does not provide
much predicting power in other periods.
We next turn to the unconditional model, which investigates the cross-sectional
dimension of the panel data, to explore consistent estimates. We identify an outlier
effect in the U.S. After controlling for the outlier effect, we find that the total effect
of the youth cohort size on the aggregate unemployment rate, revealed by the cross
sectional analysis, is consistently positive across two time periods in the U.S. In
addition, evidence from the indirect effects of youth cohort size also support the
conventional ‘cohort crowding’ literature. Specifically, youth cohort size has the
strongest positive effect on the youth unemployment rate. The marginal effect on
the age-group specific unemployment rate gets smaller as we move toward the older
age groups. These findings are in accordance with the hypothesis that young workers
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and prime age workers are not perfectly substitutable for the employers.
The cross-sectional evidence by itself could not build a causality between the
youth cohort size and the unemployment rate, since it is subject to the bias coming
from the state fixed effects. We propose an innovative method to control for both
the state fixed effects and the non-random sampling problem. This is our second
contribution to the literature. We first construct a randomized data set in the U.S.
by shuffling observations across the years for each state. Then we break them up into
two data groups. State fixed effects are removed by taking the difference between the
averages in two data groups. To obtain the statistical significance of this procedure,
we repeat the whole process thousands of times. The estimates from this pseudo-
panel indicate that the evidence from the cross-sectional analysis is a causality instead
of a correlation.
In section 3, we first provide the related literature. Section 3.2 discusses the tem-
poral correlation between unemployment rate and youth cohort size, and discusses
the reasons of the inconsistent estimates in the literature. Section 3.3 introduces the
data sets. Section 3.4 provides empirical strategies on how to solve for the inconsis-
tency, and reports the empirical results. We conclude in section 4.2.
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2. THE SLOW DOWN OF FAMILY MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
2.1 Related Literature
2.1.1 The Trend of Migration Rate in the United States
The decline of the overall interstate migration rate in the United States has drawn
the attention of economists recently. It has been well documented that during the
latest recession, the overall migration rate in the U.S. has sharply gone down, from
in 2007 to in 2010.
Kaplan and Wohl [2010], however, point out that the decrease in the migration
rate since the latest recession is not as dramatic as seen in the published estimates.
When correcting the changes in the imputation procedures, the interstate migration
rate in recent years simply follows a long-term declining trend over the past several
decades. For this reason, this paper focused on the long term declining migration
trend, while ignoring the recent sharp decline because of potential measurement
problem associated with the most recent data. Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak [2011]
have also documented the declining migration trend since the 1980s in the United
States. They argue that it is of more merit to investigate the migration rate over a
longer time period, instead of focusing on the short-run cyclical phenomenon, if the
recent drop in the migration rate is no more than a continuation of a long-term falling
trend. However, even though they find that there is a widespread decrease in the
interstate migration rate across different subgroups of the population, the underlying
reasons are still unknown and puzzling. They do not identify the decreasing family
migration rate in their study.
Pingle [2007] studies the trend in aggregate interstate migration rate in the United
States from the 1950s to the early 2000s. However, when the military personnel
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and their related families are extracted from the overall population, the declining
migration propensity is not as significant as originally assessed in the data. Therefore,
he concludes that the decline in military personnel is the primary determinant for
the decreasing interstate migration rate. For most U.S. civilians, they are as mobile
as before in changing locations.
Among earlier studies (Rogerson [1987], Long [1988] and Greenwood [1984],
Greenwood [1997]) finds that there is a significant decrease in the annual migration
propensity of young people ages 20-24 from 8.9 percent in the 1970s to 5.8 percent
in the 1980s. The possible explanations include the lower marriage rate, higher un-
employment rate, and cohort crowding effect for the baby boom generation. But
these are still untested hypotheses due to a limited amount of data available for a
thorough analysis.
Another recent study on the long run trend of the migration rate in the United
States is by Partridge, Rickman, Olfert, and Ali [2010]. The sample period they
focus on is the 2000s. They hypothesize that the migration rate in the United States
in the past decade is low because the economy is approaching a spatial equilibrium.
All of the differences in amenities across regions have already been internalized into
the prices and wages. People no longer feel the need to move to another state, due
to this spatial equilibrium. However, their empirical findings provide no support for
such a conjecture.
2.1.2 Migration, Education, Home Ownership and Family Ties
Since the 1960s, economists have considered migration as an investment in human
activity (Sjaastad [1962]). People are rational actors and compare moving costs with
benefits in making migration decisions. If the return from the migration outweighs
the cost, then it would be better off to change locations, in terms of higher utility.
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The most recent study which follows this approach is by Kennan and Walker [2011].
Their work directly verifies that the individual’s migration decisions are affected by
the prospects of future income in a structural dynamic model. It also adds addi-
tional evidence to the findings in Topel [1986] and Blanchard and Katz [1992], which
indicate that labor flows are responsive to differential local labor market conditions.
Mincer [1978] provides a theoretical analysis in distinguishing between the indi-
vidual and family migration choices. To maximize the total utility of the family, one
of the spouses may sacrifice the personal gains which could be obtained by making
the decision individually, and follow that decision which is optimal for the family.
For example, the family would choose to relocate if one spouse’s net gain in moving
to a new place exceeds the losses of the other. The family would move, and the
spouse who is taking a loss is called the tied mover. The spouse who forgoes his/her
own gain from migration becomes a tied stayer. If the relocation decision involves
multiple location options, both husband and wife may become tied movers or tied
stayers at the same time since the final destination may not be the best for each of
the spouses, but is optimal for the entire family. The difference and correlation of the
gains from migration between husband and wife play important roles in the family
migration decision. Otherwise, if the gains from migration for the wife and husband
are perfectly correlated - meaning, when each receives a positive gain, and vice versa
- then marital status does not affect the migration decision at all. If the correla-
tion between the two individual gains is weak, the migration probability would be
reduced. Gemici [2011] employs a dynamic model of household migration decisions
by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and finds that in accordance
with the implications in Mincer [1978], if the spouse in the family were single, the
migration rate should be about 5-7 percent higher than the migration rate observed
when they are married.
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Another set of related literature is about the relationship between education and
migration propensity. Especially for long-distance moves, college-educated people
have been found to be much more likely to move than those with less education.
The labor market for the college graduates is larger in scope. College graduates are
more aware of opportunities in other locations far away from their current locations.
Therefore, they are more willing to take the benefit of different economic oppor-
tunities resulting from moving. Based on the CPS data from 1980 to 2000, after
controlling for age, state of origin, and year fixed effects, Basker [2003] finds that the
probability of migration increases with education. In a recent study, Wozniak [2010]
shows that workers with higher educational attainment are more likely than high
school graduates to live in a state that has high labor demand. She also concludes
that higher-educated workers are more sensitive to the local labor market conditions
in choosing a state of residence. If college graduates are the main force in migration,
and the migration propensity for them declines, then the aggregate migration rate
would be significantly affected. It is crucial to understand the underlying reasons
behind such a decline.
By investigating the Census data from 1970s to 1990s, Costa and Kahn [2000]
find that the power couples are increasingly concentrated in large metropolitan areas.
They argue that it is due to the co-location problem faced by this type of couples,
and not because of the increasing urbanization of the college-educated. However, by
using the PSID, Compton and Pollak [2007] find no evidence showing that power
couples are more likely to migrate to large metropolitan areas than other family
types, such as part-power or lower power couples. Within a family, the migration
decision is relevant to the husband’s education, not the wife’s. Their findings suggest
that this higher proportion of power couples is the result of a higher rate of power
couple formation in the metropolitan area. It is not because power couples form a
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family elsewhere and then migrate to large labor markets for better opportunities
or amenities. Our findings in this paper may enrich the story by indicating that
once power couples are formed in the metropolitan areas, they are less likely to
migrate nowadays since they are trapped by the increasing home ownership and the
exacerbating co-location problem.
Another important determinant of migration is home ownership (Henley [1998],
Dietz and Haurin [2003]). Most earlier studies find that homeowners are less likely to
migrate than renters are. The most direct reason is that homeowners incur more sub-
stantial transaction cost than that of renters. Since housing is a financial investment,
the homeowners may also compare the capital gains with their initial housing invest-
ment and consider the down payment constraints on purchasing a new home in the
potential destination. Most recently, Winkler [2010] develops a dynamic structural
model and examines the effect of home ownership on mobility and labor income. He
provides evidence that owning a home makes workers less likely to move in response
to labor market shocks. He also finds that home owners who suffer from a decrease in
home equity are 40% less mobile. However, none of these studies explicitly controls
for the endogeneity of the home ownership.
Many macroeconomic factors would also influence the population flow. For exam-
ple, spatial differences such as local labor demand and living amenities would cause
a worker to relocate. However, these possible explanations are not the focus in this
paper. Firstly, family migration and individual migration show quite different pat-
terns. If the spatial equilibrium is the crux, then it should not discriminate singles
against couples. Second, Molly, Smith and Wozniak [2011] also show that the net
population flow across the regions have not changed substantially over the past 25
years, which in turn does not support the spatial equilibrium theory.
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2.2 Data
The primary data source used in this paper is the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS), the March Supplement from the Integrated Public Use Microsamples
(IPUMS), which provides nationwide representative data on migration across a long
time period. We could identify the interstate migration through the variable “MI-
GRATE1” in the IPUMS-CPS, which informs whether the respondent has moved
across different states, across counties within a state, within the county, or has stayed
in the same house in the previous year. It has been available for most years since
1963, except for 1972-1975, 1978-1980, 1985, and 1995. The CPS also provides
detailed demographic and socioeconomic characteristics including home tenure, oc-
cupation, industry, employment status, and earnings. Information about the home
ownership status in the respondent’s current location has been available in the CPS
since 1976. Yearly earnings have been available since the 1960s, however, the actual
number of working weeks and weekly working hours used to calculate hourly wages
can only be obtained after 1977. Therefore if we employ hourly wage or working
hours in our analysis, the data set would begin from 1977. All annual earnings or
hourly wages are deflated to the 2010 U.S. dollar value by the Consumer Price In-
dexes (CPI)-All Urban Consumers, released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The IPUMS-CPS has been providing consistent long-term classification codes
of occupations since 1968. There are about 400 occupation categories according to
the 1990 occupation scheme. For the purpose of our analysis, we classify them into
seven broadly defined categories.1
The sample used in this study only consists of working-age individuals whose ages
1They are managerial occupations, professional specialty occupations, technical, sales and ad-
ministrative support occupations, service occupations, farming, forestry, and fishing occupations,
precision production, craft, and repair occupations, operators, fabricators, and laborers occupations.
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are between 25 and 64. Respondents that are less than 25 years old are excluded,
since many of them still affiliate with their parents and are not independent enough
to make their own major decisions, such as migration. People serving in the military
and those who were in school when they were surveyed are excluded as well. These
two groups of people are not the targeted people whose migration decisions respond
to common economic incentives as concerned in this paper. The sample unit used
in our econometric analysis is at a family level, not by the individual or household,
since our ultimate goal is to explain changes in the family’s migration decisions. For
households with multiple families, we only focus on the primary family with the
household head.
We also exclude any data recorded in the CPS after 2005. The migration rate has
fallen sharply since 2006, a time around the most recent economic recession. Kaplan
and Wohl [2010] point out that this dramatic change in the migration rates results
from the change in the imputation procedure of CPS missing data. In the analysis
of the CPS before 2006, interstate migration rate is overestimated. Therefore, after
the bias is corrected by the CPS prior to 2006, a gap is generated. Kaplan and Wohl
[2010] show that the migration rate in the last few years simply follows a continuation
of the long run downward trend after unifying the data analysis. In our analysis,
to make the estimates comparable across these years, we mainly focus on the data
before 2006 and circumvent any inconsistency created by the imputation method of
the CPS.
In addition to CPS data, we also collect several housing market related variables
at the state level to predict home ownership prior to migration. These variables
include median housing price, morgage rate, property tax rate and median income.
The souces for each are listed below:
Housing price - Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Land and Property Values in
13
the U.S.).
Mortgage Rate - Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Property Tax - The Tax Foundation Property Taxes on Owner (2004-2009). Cen-
sus Bureau - American Housing Survey (1980-2000).
Income - U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2.3 Trends in the Interstate Migration Rate in the United States
Panel A in Figure 2.1 shows the rate of the population that migrated across states
by using the CPS data from 1964 to 2005. It indicates the number of interstate
movers out of 100 people. The overall interstate migration rate is observed as almost
stable in the past fifty years.2
As the first step to understand the aggregate trend of cross-state migration rate,
it is critical to know if this trend is widespread among all kinds of demographic
groups, or if it is a less representative phenomenon for specific subgroups in the
population. We calculate the group specific migration rates conditionally on several
major demographic characteristics, including age, gender, race, marriage status, and
educational attainment. Specifically, we have two age groups. People between the
ages of 25-40 and 41-64 are regarded as the young and the old in the prime age
population, respectively.3 For marital status, people who are divorced, widowed, or
separated at the time of the survey are allocated to the singles group. We have three
2The data used in this subsection only include people who are older than 25. The figures reported
about the migration rate in the two periods of 1965-1970 and 2000-2005 are based upon the working
age population. When the youngest group are excluded, there is almost no declining trend of the
overall migration rate.
3We could make the categories even finer instead of just breaking down people into the young
and the old. For example, each age between 25 and 64 could be considered as an individual age
group. However, since we are going to figure out the aggregate migration rate by year, observations
in each age cell with smaller amount of observations would reduce the statistical significance of the
estimates. We also examined the results by doing this way. The variance of the trend is greater,
but the overall pattern is quite similar.
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Figure 2.1: Interstate Migration by Demographic Groups (1964-2005).
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groups by educational attainment at this stage: the high school, some college, and
the college graduate. The high school graduate includes those who have no more
than 12 years of schooling. The graduate with some college includes those who have
some college background but do not obtain a bachelor degree. The college educated
are defined as those who have completed at least 4 years of college.
Two series of migration rates by age groups are plotted in Panel B of Figure 2.1.
The group specific migration rates by the young and the old do not show a significant
difference in the pattern of the overall trend, even though there is modest decline in
the migration propensity of the young.
In Figure 2.1 - Panel C, it is shown that the migration rate for females is lower
than that for males before 2000. This gap is generated by the difference of the
migration propensities in the singles group, since married couples usually migrate
as a family unit, which shows less discrepancy by gender. Single females are less
likely to migrate than their male counterparts. Mincer [1978] points out that single
women, especially the young single women, are more attached to their families or
relatives. There is no discernable difference in the migration pattern over the years
between male and female and the migration rates of these groups are closely tracing
the aggregate migration rate.
The migration propensities by different races plotted in Figure 2.1-Panel D in-
dicate that blacks are more likely to be affected by the economic environment. As
whites account for the majority of the population in the United States, it is not
surprising that the evolution of migration rate for this group almost replicates the
one we have seen from the aggregate rate for the whole nation.
The most interesting findings come from the groups segmented by educational
attainment and marital status. As shown in Figure 2.1 - Panel E, the decreasing
trend is most substantial for college graduates: a decrease of 15 percent from 1960s
16
to 1980s and another 10 percent from 1980s to 2000s. The trend is more modest for
the group with some college. In contrast, the propensity of migration for high school
graduates barely changes during the sample period. The migration rate of college
graduates is all-around higher than that for those with some college or high school
degree, since jobs requiring college degrees are more specialized, and college graduates
would benefit the most from a broader geographic scope to reduce the search frictions.
As the migration rates mainly drop among the college and some college graduates,
the migration propensity of these three groups with different education background
tend to converge in the 2000s.
Figure 2.1 - Panel F shows different patterns of the migration trend for singles
and the married. The migration propensity of the married started from almost the
same level as the singles in 1960s. Since then, migration rate for the married has
been falling stage by stage while the migration rate of singles has been increasing
modestly in the past 50 years.
Based upon the findings above, as the second stage analysis, we decompose the
demographic groups even further by interacting educational attainment with marital
status. Since the graduates with some college and college graduates have similar
migration trends as shown in Figure 2.1- Panel E, we group together people who
have completed at least 2 years of college with college graduates to simplify our
analysis.
We therefore have four types of married couples and two types of singles. The
four types of married people are power couples with two college graduates, couples
with a college-graduate husband, couples with a college-graduate wife, and couples
with two high school graduates. A power couple is defined as a couple in which both
the husband and wife are college graduates. In Costa and Kahn [2000], they do not
distinguish between couples with a college-graduate husband and the couples with
17
a college-graduate wife. However, given the specific problem we are discussing here,
a couple with a college-graduate husband or a college-graduate wife might display
quite different migration behavior. When both husband and wife have less than 13
years of schooling, the couple is regarded as a couple with two high school graduates.
Similarly, according to the educational attainment, there are college singles and high
school singles. Figure 2.2 shows the trends of the migration rate for four types of
couples and two types of singles separately.
When comparing the migration propensities for couples, we find that power cou-
ples and couples with a college-graduate husband show a sharp decrease in the trends
of migration rate, while couples with a college-graduate wife and couples with two
high school graduates have stable migration propensities. For singles, the migration
rate of college graduates follows a more modest declining trend only after the 1990s,
whereas the migration rate of high school singles is almost constant over time.
These findings suggest that the group-specific migration propensity evolves differ-
ently among these six types of couples. The contribution of each group’s migration
propensity trend to the pattern of the overall migration rate is not clear yet. These
groups have different shares in the total population and their shares vary greatly in
the sample period as well. The educational attainment of these individuals in the
United States has been increasing steadily. This trend could be reflected by the share
of people who have completed secondary education. Since 1964, the proportion of
people with at least one year of college has almost tripled, from around 20 percent
to almost 60 percent. Given that college graduates generally have higher migration
rates, if the migration propensity of college graduates is fixed over the years, as that
in the 1960s, then the overall interstate migration rate should increase rather than
show a modest decline or stagnant trend. Therefore, within the group of college
graduates, the interstate migration propensity of the married couples drops so sig-
18
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Figure 2.2: Interstate Migration by Family Types (1964-2005).
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nificantly that the potential increase in the migration rate that would have resulted
from an increasing proportion of these people is canceled.
The bottom panel in Figure 2.2 also presents the proportion of these groups over
the years. As expected, the share of couples with two high school graduates in the
population drops sharply from 60 percent in the 1960s to 25 percent in the 2000s.
The share of high school singles varies in the range of 14-18 percent over the years.
Overall, it increases very slightly. In contrast, the greatest increase in the share is
coming from the group of power couples. The percentage of people that are coming
from a power couple family is only 10% in the 1960s. Since then, this rate has been
continually increasing and it reached 30 percent in 2005. The share of couples with
one college-graduate wife also increases, but the change is small compared with power
couples. The share of college singles are increasing along with the rising number of
college graduates.
The increasing rate of college singles, together with the quite stable time series of
high school singles, suggests that the marriage rate of Americans has been declining
over the past years. It is indeed true that in the mid-1960s the marriage rate was
about 80 percent of all U.S. men and women aged 18-64, but since then, the marriage
rate had begun to decline as more women gained higher education and joined the
workforce. More women become career-oriented and therefore delay their marriage
age and first-child delivery. Divorce rate of Americans also increases, probably be-
cause women are getting more economically independent. Married couples are less
likely to migrate, compared with their single counterparts, because they are tied
together in the migration decision. The decreasing share of married couples tends to
offset the influence of their decreasing migration propensity on the overall interstate
migration pattern.
We next conduct several counterfactual analysis to explicitly show how changes
20
in the migration propensities across groups and the changing population composition
affects the overall migration rate.
First, we set the population shares of all six types of people to be constant as
the 1960s averages and use the observed group-specific migration rate to predict a
counterfactual series.
Mˆi
t
=
6∑
i=1
S¯1960i M
t
i , (2.1)
where i denotes the six types of people, S¯i is the averaged population share in the
1960s, and Mi is the group-specific migration rate. Unsurprisingly, as shown in
Figure 2.3 - Panel A, if the composition has remained constant at the level of the
averages in the 1960s, the overall migration rate should have fallen more than what
we have seen. It indicates that the increasing share of the college educated tends to
pull up the overall migration rate.
Second, if the migration propensities for all groups are held constant at the 1960s
levels, the predicted counterfactual series would be
Mˆi
t
=
6∑
i=1
StiM¯
1960
i . (2.2)
Here Sj is the actual population share and M¯i denotes the average migration rate in
the 1960s for group i. The predicted series of overall migration rate have been steadily
increasing over the past 50 years because the share of the more mobile people-the
college-educated-is increasing, see Figure 2.3 Panel B. These results suggest that it is
the declining migration propensities of these subgroups that drives down the overall
migration rate.
To quantify the significance of the migration propensity of each group in deter-
mining the the overall migration rate separately, we hold the migration propensity
21
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Figure 2.3: Accounting Analysis of the Change in Migration Rate (1964-2005).
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for one type of people fixed at the average level in 1960s in turn, and compare these
predicted series of aggregate migration rates with the actual aggregate migration
rate. Note that the predicted migration propensity becomes
Mˆi
t
= StiM¯
1960
i +
∑
j 6=i
StjM
t
j . (2.3)
The effect on the overall migration rate due to the change in the migration propen-
sity of each group is isolated by examining the gap between reference series and
predicted series. When comparing the remaining panels plotted in Figure 2.3, the
greatest gap between the predicted and the reference series is obtained by control-
ling the migration propensity for the power couple. If everything else changes in the
manner as it actually does, except for the migration propensity of power couples, we
should not have seen a decline in the overall migration rate at all. The migration
propensity of couples with a college-graduate husband shows effects similar to that
of the power couples, but with a much smaller magnitude. For other groups, the pre-
dicted series closely track the reference series over the years, indicating little effect
of the changing migration propensities of these groups. The evidence revealed by
this counterfactual analysis basically corresponds to the findings presented in Panel
E and Panel F of Figure 2.1, but it directly shows us how large the effect of the de-
clining migration propensity from power couples and couples with a college-graduate
husband could be on the overall pattern of the migration rate.
The main task is to provide explanations for the findings described in this sub-
section. Note that these factors should mainly affect the couples rather than the
singles, since we find that it is the migration propensity of couples that drop, not the
singles’. In addition, these determinants would have larger effects on power couples
and couples with a college-educated husband.
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When comparing the decision-making of migration by singles and couples, we
find that the family migration decision is made by the family members jointly rather
than individually. Spouses are tied to each other in the migration decision. Migration
does not necessarily mutually benefit both husband and wife, especially when the
husband and wife are strongly attached to their jobs. The conflicts between a working
husband and a working wife in the migration decisions is usually inevitable, if the
earning difference between husband and wife is insignificant, or the chance of a
mutual gain from migration is small. Another important difference between singles
and couples is that couples are more likely to reside in their own houses, while singles
tend to live in their parent’s house, or they will rent. The transaction cost associated
with selling and purchasing new houses when people move has an impeding effect on
migration. We expect that the housing-related considerations for migration decisions
should be more prevalent among the the couples.
2.4 Conceptual Framework
Mincer [1978] develops a theoretical analysis in distinguishing between the indi-
vidual and family migration decisions. The framework is based on the assumption
that married couples maximize the total utility of the family, not the utility of anyone
of the spouses. In this setup, one of the spouses may sacrifice the personal gains that
could be obtained by making the migration decision individually, when that spouse
follows the migration decision which is optimal for the whole family. For example,
one family would choose to stay if one of the spouse’s net gain from moving to another
location is less than the losses of the other spouse. The conflict in the gains from
migration between the spouses will deter migration. In this example, the individual
gains from the migration of the two spouses have opposite signs, and one spouse’s
gain dominates that of the other, which implies that the difference and correlation
24
of the gains from migration between husband and wife both play important roles in
the family migration decisions.
In the spirit of Mincer [1978], we develop a simple theoretical model for family
migration in a search framework, where we discuss the penitential roles played by
the female labor force participation, earning ratio of wife to husband, correlation of
the gains received between the spouses from migration, and home ownership status
in determining the family migration. Our framework extends Mincer’s theory model
in three aspects. First, the husband and wife, and the whole family’s gain from
migration is explicitly derived from earning draws. In Mincer’s model, the gains from
migration is not materialized into measurable components. Therefore the hypothesis
of the model cannot be directly tested. Our set-up in this paper facilitates later
empirical analysis as the gain from the migration is not readily observable in the
data, but the earnings for husband and wife are available as long as they work. It
also enables us to propose a method to estimate the correlation of earnings from job
offers between husband and wife. Second, we fit the female labor force participation
into the model. It allows us to examine to what extent female’s willingness to work at
an extensive margin affects the migration probability. Third, we specify the migration
cost as a transaction cost associated with home ownership. Therefore, the effect of
home ownership on the migration is incorporated. The model allows us to assess the
joint effects of the factors targeted in this paper in a unified framework.
We suppose that the current earnings of the husband and wife are e0h and e
0
w,
respectively. A dummy δ is introduced to indicate the wife’s choice of labor force
participation. The husband and wife are receiving new job offers from other states in
each period. The new offered earnings are denoted as eh and ew for the husband and
wife, respectively. And they are assumed to fulfill a bivariate normal distribution,
i.e., (eh, ew) ∼ N(γhe0h, γwe0w, σ2h, σ2w, ρ). Here γi (i = h,w) is a discount factor of the
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average earning from the job offers relative to the current earning, and ρ denotes the
correlation between the husband’s and wife’s earnings from new job offers. For the
sake of simplicity, we would further assume that the moving cost is solely caused by
owing a home and neglect all the other possible moving costs. Therefore, the moving
cost discussed here could be regarded as the transaction cost of selling and buying a
home. Transaction cost is assumed to be proportional to the family earnings, since
housing is a normal good. A family with higher earnings are more likely to own a
more valuable house, and the transaction cost varies with the value of the house. ∆
signifies home ownership. It is greater than zero and changes along with the home
value for home owners, while it is zero for renters.
Then the net gain of the family from migration Gf = eh+δww−(e0h+δe0w)(1+∆)
satisfies the normal distribution N(µGf , σ
2
Gf
), with
µGf = γhe
0
h + δγwe
0
w − (e0h + δe0w)(1 + ∆) (2.4a)
σ2Gf = σ
2
h + δ
2σ2w + 2ρδσhσw , (2.4b)
as the mean and variance, respectively. Because γh, γw < 1, µGf is negative and the
center of the distribution of the net gain is to the left of Gf = 0. This agrees with
the common sense that only a small portion of the population moves within a short
time period.
The family decides to migrate if they can receive benefits from moving, i.e., the
net gain is positive. Thus, the probability of family migration is Prob(Gf > 0),
which equals the area of the distribution of the gain to the right of Gf = 0, can be
represented as
Prob(Gf > 0) = 1− Φ
(
−µGf
σGf
)
= Φ
(
µGf
σGf
)
. (2.5)
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where
µGf
σGf
=
[γ − (1 + ∆)]e0h
σh
1 + δrw√
1 + δ2r2σ + 2ρδrσ
. (2.6)
Here rw denotes the earning ratio of wife to husband e
0
w/e
0
h, and rσ = σw/σh, the
ratio of the standard deviation of earnings from job offers between the spouses. Note
that we have make the assumption that γh = γw ≡ γ.4 We also assume that the
standard deviation of an individual’s earnings monotonically vary with the value of
it. The higher the current earnings is, the greater the variation of earnings from new
job offers. Specifically, σi/e
0
i = αi, which is a constant. Under this condition, we
have rσ = σw/σh = αw/αhrw ≡ αrw.
Taking the partial derivative of rw on equation (2.5), we have the marginal effect
of the earning ratio of wife to husband as,
∂Prob(Gf > 0)
∂rw
(2.7)
=
1√
2pi
exp
(
− µ
2
Gf
2σ2Gf
)
[γ − (1 + ∆)]e0h
σh
· δ(1 + αρδrw − α
2δrw − αρ)
(1 + 2αρδrw + δ2α2r2w)
3/2
.
If δ 6= 0, the sign of the above equation depends on the sign of 1+αρδrw−α2δrw−αρ,
which is positive when the following conditions are satisfied,
α >
−ρ(1− δrw)−
√
ρ2(1− δrw)2 + 4δrw
2δrw
, (2.8a)
α <
−ρ(1− δrw) +
√
ρ2(1− δrw)2 + 4δrw
2δrw
. (2.8b)
Since α > 0, while the right side of inequality (2.8a) is negative, so inequality (2.8a)
4Relaxing this assumption would not alter the model predictions, but only make the equations
for marginal effects more redundant.
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holds automatically. If we further assume that, compared with men, women nor-
mally do not have their mean job offers more disperse across geographic locations.
Therefore, α = αw/αh ≤ 1. The right side of inequality (2.8b)
−ρ(1− δrw) +
√
ρ2(1− δrw)2 + 4δrw
2δrw
≥ 1 . (2.9)
“=” holds only if ρ = 1. So inequality (2.8b) holds unless both α = 1 and ρ = 1.
Therefore, the marginal effect of the earning ratio is generally negative. Only if
α = 1 and ρ = 1, the earning ratio has no effect on the family migration rate. Note
that here the deterrent effect still exists due to the confliction between individual
gains of the two spouses even if ρ = 1 when α < 1. It seems to conflict with
Mincer’s theory, in which the earning ratio/differnce between spouses is irrelevant to
the migration decision once the gains of migration are perfectly correlated between
the two spouses. This is because the definitions of ρ are different in Mincer [1978]
and our paper. In Mincer’s model, the correlation ρ is the correlation of gains from
migration. Therefore, when ρ = 1, if the husband’s gain is greater (less) than 0, the
wife’s gain is also greater (less) than 0. The family migration decision based on the
husband’s own gain is the same as the migration decision based on the wife’s own
gain. There is no confliction between their individual gains when making the family
migration decision. In our model, ρ is the correlation between the earnings of the two
spouses’ job offers from earning draws. ρ = 1 means that if the husband’s earning
from his new job offer eh is greater (less) than his average γe
0
h, the wife’s earning
from her new job offer ew is also greater (less) than her average γe
0
w. However, as
γ < 1, it is still possible that eh is greater than the current earning e
0
h, while ew
is less than the current earning e0w, or vice versa. In such cases, the gain of family
migration might be negative. Only when α = 1 and ρ = 1, the probabilities of
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becoming a tied mover in the family migration are equalized between the husband
and wife. Hence the earning ratio of wife to husband has no influence on the family
migration decision. From equation (2.7), we also find that when δ = 0, the wife
does not have any contribution to the gains from family migration. In this case, the
family decides migrate or not just in the same way as the husband makes the choice
on his own.
Similarly, when the inequality equation defined in inequalities (2.8a) and (2.8b)
holds, we find
∂Prob(Gf > 0)
∂δ
(2.10)
=
1√
2pi
exp
(
− µ
2
Gf
2σ2Gf
)
[γ − (1 + ∆)]e0h
σh
· rw(1 + αρδrw − α
2δrw − αρ)
(1 + 2αρδrw + δ2α2r2w)
3/2
< 0 .
The labor force participation of the wife deters migration. When wife’s labor force
attachment is strong, i.e., δ = 1, then wife’s individual gain from migration con-
tributes to the total family gain, which lowers the family migration propensity when
everything else is controlled for. Wife’s willingness to work raises the chance that one
of the spouses gains but the other loses in the migration . When δ = 0, the family’s
gain from migration is totally determined by the husband’s personal gain. The wife
has no contribution to the family income, nor any confliction with her husband’s
individual migration decision.
For the correlation of the earnings from new job offers, we have
∂Prob(Gf > 0)
∂ρ
(2.11)
= − 1√
2pi
exp
(
− µ
2
Gf
2σ2Gf
)
[γ − (1 + ∆)]e0h
σh
αδrw(1 + δrw)
(1 + 2αρδrw + α2δ2r2w)
3/2
≥ 0 .
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The marginal effect of the correlation in earnings is positive unless δrw = 0. As the
correlation in earnings becomes small or even negative, it is very likely that one of the
spouses gains but the other loses in the family migration. Therefore, the probability
of a joint gain from the migration decreases. When δrw = 0, the earnings of the
wife are negligible. In this situation, the family’s gain from migration is the same as
the husband’s personal gain, the correlation becomes irrelevant in determining the
family migration probability.
Finally, for the moving cost, we have
∂Prob(Gf > 0)
∂∆
(2.12)
= − 1√
2pi
exp
(
− µ
2
G
2σ2G
)
e0h
σh
1 + δrw√
1 + α2δ2r2w + 2αρδrw
< 0 .
As expected, the moving cost deters migration for all values of δ and ρ. In order for
the family which owns a house to move, the family income has to increase more to
offset the moving cost in the migration.
In sum, the above theory model predicts that the family migration probability
decreases with the earning ratio of wife to husband, wife’s labor force participation
and home ownership, while it increases with the correlation of earnings from new
job offers between spouses. Compared with singles, possible conflicts between the
individual gains from migration of the two spouses is an important determinant
for the lower migration propensity of families. In addition, as married couples are
generally much more likely to own a house, differences in the migration probabilities
between singles and families could be partially attributed to the home ownership.
Before ending this subsection, we would point out some limitations of this model.
First, when discussing the gain from migration, we assume equal bargaining power
between the husband and wife on the family migration decision. (We simply add
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the gain of the husband and wife to obtain the family gain from migration). But in
reality, there exists unobserved factors that affect the bargaining power. For example,
one spouse of the family, usually the wife, may not be as much career-oriented as
the other spouse, which produces an unbalanced bargaining power regardless what
job offers they receive. In addition, it is very likely that the bargaining power of
spouses depends on their education background, which reflects their potential earning
ability. That is because individuals with higher education usually invest more in their
education and thus are more eagerly searching for better jobs. Therefore, families
with dual college graduates are more likely to have equal bargaining powers than
families with a college husband or wife. In this sense this model works best for
power-couples.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 Home Ownership Prior to Migration
One challenge in our econometric analysis is that, in the CPS, it only reports the
respondent’s current home ownership status, not the pre-migration home ownership
status in the previous year of the interview.
Two alternative methods could be employed to solve the problem. First, we may
relate the pre-migration home ownership status to the post-migration home owner-
ship. We need a different panel data set such as PSID to estimate such relationship
and use the coefficient estimates to predict the pre-migration home ownership in the
CPS data. The usable PSID data starts in 1964 and ends in 1992, but the CPS data
employed in this paper covers the period of 1982-2005. We have to implicitly assume
that the preference of home ownership of households pre- or post-migration does not
vary over time when their basic characteristics are controlled for, and the samples
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in two data sources are comparable. In addition to these assumptions we need to
make, the measure constructed for the pre-migration home ownership in this way is
endogenous to the decision of migration. Therefore, the estimate for the effect of
home ownership on migration is biased.
To address the endogeneity of home ownership, we propose a alternative measure
for the pre-migration home ownership. Instead of using the observed home ownership
status after migration, we employ the state averages of housing value, per-capita
income, property tax and mortgage rate to predict the house purchasing decisions.
For a household, these factors are exogenously determined. We proceeds in two steps.
Firstly, the home ownership of a family in the current state is estimated by a set of
controls together with these variables.
I[Home = 1] = α+ β
′
X + γ
′
Z ++δ
′
D + θ
′
D × Z + λ′hZ × CLGh + λ
′
wZ × CLGw
+ψ
′
hD × Z × CLGh + ψ
′
wD × Z × CLGw + ε , (2.13)
where X represents a vector of demographic variables, including age, wife’s and
husband’s education, head’s race, marriage status, number of kids under 18. Z =
[Income, Propterty Tax, Mortgage, Home Value], which characterizes the housing
market in a state. D are the year dummies. CLGh and CLGw indicate whether
the husband and wife are college graduates or not. The sample period starts in
1982, since it is the earliest year in which the location of a household preceding
the survey year is available in the CPS. After the parameters in the regression are
estimated, for each family, we replace the housing value, per-capita income, property
tax, and mortgage rate by the values associated with the state in the previous year.
The pre-migration home ownership is identified by the family’s characteristics and
the exogenous economic determinants, which affect the overall home ownership in a
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state. To create more variations at the individual level, we interact these economic
variables with the husband’s and wife’s educational attainment, as well as the year
dummies.
2.5.2 Correlation in the Earnings Between Wife and Husband
Before moving to the econometric analysis, another variable to be constructed
is the correlation in the earnings of new job offers from all of the possible locations
between husband and wife. As shown in the theoretical model, it is a proxy of
the correlation in the gains from migration after the transaction cost is extracted.
For a particular individual, his job offers should be primarily determined by his
personal characteristics such as age, education attainment, working experience, etc.
If we assume the payoffs for these characteristics are the same across different labor
markets, and one doesn’t change occupations when changing jobs, then the job offers
he receives are only affected by the heterogenous rewards specific to the occupation
in each labor market. An software engineer may expect higher net earnings if he
works on the same position in the Silicon Valley in the northern California than he
could earn elsewhere. The higher payment for a soft engineer in Silicon Valley is more
likely due to the agglomeration economy and economic externality over that area, not
because those companies value more of the college degree possessed by the software
engineer. In this sense, the correlation in the earnings of new job offers between
husband and wife is potentially determined by their initial occupation choices, once
other personal characteristics are controlled for.
Suppose the labor market is segmented into K sub-markets, with each of these
sub-markets considered as a state in our context. Within a family, each spouse could
receive job offers from all of the states. We use wh(k,m) (ww(k,m)) to denote the
m-th job offer from state k for the husband(wife) within a period. In addition to
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personal characteristics, the expected earnings of a worker are assumed to be related
with a state-specific premium for his/her occupation. Specifically,
wi,j(k,m) = αk,j + β1gi + β2ri + β3si + β4xi + β5x
2
i + m, i = h,w. (2.14)
where αk,j is the state average payoff for the worker’s occupation j. gi, ri, si, and xi
denote the gender, race, education, and age, respectively. m is a random error term
and its mean is zero. Therefore, an individual’s average wage from all potential job
offers is given by,
wi,j =
1
KM
∑
k
∑
m
(
αk,j + β1gi + β2ri + β3si + β4xi + β5x
2
i + m
)
=
1
K
∑
k
(
αk,j + β1gi + β2ri + β3si + β4xi + β5x
2
i
)
=
1
K
∑
k
αk,j + β1gi + β2ri + β3si + β4xi + β5x
2
i , i = h,w. (2.15)
We further assume that there is no additional correlation in the error terms for any
workers after we control the personal characteristics and his occupation. Under this
assumption, the correlation of earnings between the husband with occupation jh and
wife with occupation jw becomes,
Corr(wh,jh(k,m), ww,jw(k, n))
=
1
KM2
∑
k
∑
m,n
(
αk,jh + β1gh + β2rh + β3sh + β4xh + β5x
2
h + m − wh,jh
)
× (αk,jw + β1gw + β2rw + β3sw + β4xw + β5x2w + n − ww,jw)
=
1
K
∑
k
(
αk,jh −
1
K
∑
l
αl,jh
)(
αk,jw −
1
K
∑
l
αl,jw
)
. (2.16)
The above equation indicates that the correlation of earnings within a family is
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mainly from the differences in payoffs for the occupations of the husband and wife
across states. If the occupations of the husband and wife are the same, changes in
the earnings between husband and wife by moving to the same location are perfectly
correlated. If their occupations are different, the correlation is less than 1. In other
words, when the signs of the two terms in the parenthesis differ, then the correlation
is negative.
The above equations direct us to construct the measure of this correlation between
the husband and wife as follows. For a particular occupation, we first regress the
earnings on the workers characteristics including sex, race, age, education, and state
fixed effects. For each occupation in one period, we obtain a set of estimates for the
state dummies. Upon substituting the estimates of the state dummies of jh and jw
into equation (2.16), we could have the value of ρ, the correlation of earnings from
job offers in a family with occupation pair of (jh, jw).
Table 2.1: Employment Status and Migration.
Wife Husband
Migrants Non-Migrants Migrants Non-Migrants
Employed at t− 1 7810 329723 10437 416542
Non-Employed at t− 1 2996 105797 459 18978
Employed Ratio 72.3% 75.7% 95.8% 95.75%
One problem to be addressed is that there are samples with missing values on the
occupation code. According to the CPS data description, it records the respondent’s
primary occupation. If the respondent was working when they are surveyed, he re-
ports his job for the week prior to the survey.5 If the respondent was not working,
5If a respondent was working when he was interviewed, he is guaranteed to have a occupation
recorded in the CPS.
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then he was asked for his most resent job. We could not observe the occupation for
some of the respondents if they never work, thus none occupation can be identified.
In all of our regression analysis, we exclude the families where husband has no occu-
pation record. It does not affect our final results since these families only accounts
for a small portion of the whole sample. Men’s labor force participation rate is much
higher than women and their labor force participation choice is less likely subject
to the influence from migration. According to the final sample that we construct,
the employment ratios of the husbands from migrant families in the pre- and post-
survey years are nearly the same as those of the husbands from non-migrant fam-
ilies. The comparison are shown in Table 2.1. In contrast, we cannot simply omit
the families where wives report no occupation. According to Table 2.2, about 80%
of the wives who were not working when being interviewed and have no occupation
recorded did not work anytime in the previous year either. We believe a majority
of them were non-labor force participants. However, the remaining 20% of those
wives reported that they worked sometime in the previous year. The migration rate
among these families is high, since it is common that a wife who migrates along with
her husband could not immediately find a job in the new location. If we eliminate
these families from the analysis, we would miss a group of typical migrant couples.
Therefore, instead of deleting the families where there are no occupation codes for
the wives, we assign them the values of earnings correlation in the following way. For
a family where the husband has an occupation jh but wife’s occupation is missing,
we calculate a weighed average of the correlation measure by using the values of the
families with occupation pair of (jh, jw), jw = 1, 2, ..., 7. The number of the families
in which the husband has occupation jh and the wife has occupation jw is taken as
the weight. Compared with averaging across all families, we take into account the
distribution of the husband’s and wife’s job choices combination. For example, if
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men with occupation 1 are more likely to marry with women with occupation 2, the
correlation in the earnings between a husband and wife with occupation 1 and occu-
pation 2 should be given more weight, once we predict the earnings correlation for
the families where husband has occupation 1 but wife’s occupation code is missing.
2.5.3 Wife’s Labor Force Participation and Wife-Husband Earning Ratio
The theoretical model predicts that the wife’s employment status and the earning
ratio between wife and husband negatively affect the family migration decisions. As
Long [1974] and Mincer [1978] noted, the proper employment status which should
be used to measure the deterrent effects are the ones that occur before migration.6
In CPS, it reports the employment and labor force status during the survey week in
March, as well as the total weeks and usual hours worked per week prior to the survey
year. However, we couldn’t directly employ the reported values of the employment
status and earnings in the preceding year even though the information is available in
the data set. It may confound the causal relationship between labor force outcome
variables and migration choices. If nonworking wives foresee the potential of a family
migration in the near future, they might not be actively searching for employment in
the current local labor market. The negative relationship between the observed wife’s
labor force status and the migration decision would be downward biased in presence
of this possibility. This above concern also applies to the effect of pre-migration
wife-husband earning ratios on migration. Wives may work fewer weeks and earn
less in expectation to migration.
To avoid any endogeniety issue, we construct exogenous measures for the work
related variables. Specifically, we predict wife’s labor force participation through a
6Wives who work in the origin states may not immediately find a new job after the family moves
to a new state when they are surveyed. They report nonworking doesn’t mean they are not willing
to work. The labor force variables we want to employ here should reflect the real working propensity
of wives.
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standard static labor supply model. First, hourly wages are calibrated if both annual
earnings and total working hours are known. Second, a wage equation is estimated
to predict and impute wages for workers and non-workers, respectively.
The wage equation is specified as:
lnwi,t,k = αi,t,k + β1Agei,t,k + β2Age
2
i,t,k + β3Whitei,t,k + β4Blacki,t,k
+ β5Educi,t,k + β6D
j
i,t,k + εi,t,k (2.17)
i = f,m j = 2, 3, ...51 t = 1980, 1990, 2000 k = full-time, part-time
where the data is divided into groups based on gender i and work type k for each year
group t. The respondents who reported working at least 26 weeks in the past year
are labeled as full time workers, in contrast to workers who only worked less than
26 years. Only observations with valid hourly wage within the range of $2.5 to $250
are used in the regression.7 In estimating the labor force participation function we
also need to impute the hourly wage for nonworkers since their wages are unobserved.
Following Juhn [1992], Juhn and Murphy [1997], Blau and Kahn [2007], we assign the
nonworkers with predicted hourly wages imputed from regressions for the part-time
workers.
The labor supply model is given by,
E = α0 + β1 lnwown + β2 lnwspouse + A
′Z + ε (2.18)
where E is employment status, wown and wspouse is one’s own and spouse’s hourly
predicted or imputed wage offer, Z is a vector of other control variables including
family non-wage income, one’s one and spouse’s age, race, education attainment, and
7All the earning related variables are adjusted to the 2011 dollar values.
39
number of kids.
In addition to the choice of labor force participation, we also need to construct
a measure for the earning ratio of wife to husband. Actual reported values of salary
income could not be directly employed. Firstly, if wife’s labor force participation is
delayed by the prospective migration decision, the earnings of wife in these families
would be lower. Therefore the effect of earning ratio on the migration is biased as
well. Secondly, measurement errors on earnings or zero earnings of wife or husband
tend to enlarge the variance of the earning ratio.
An earnings equation is estimated separately for each year and gender group.
Apparently, earnings are positively affected by the working hours. But the focus in
this paper is not on the source of the changes in earnings. In other words, we don’t
specify the increase (decrease) in earnings is resulting from the more (less) working
hours or higher (lower) hourly wages. To predict a person’s earnings conditional
on employment, we implicitly assume that the respondent will work for an average
amount of time given the the average wage received by workers with similar charac-
teristics. The variables used in the earning equation are similar to the wage function,
but they also include number of kids and family non-wage income. Earning ratio is
defined as the log difference in earnings between husband and wife.
2.5.4 Empirical Specifications
There are two main purposes of the empirical analysis in this paper. Firstly,
the literature review and the theoretical model revealed above suggest a group of
variables that would have substantial effects in the family migration. We want to
test the effects of these variables in a reduced form regression. All the endogenous
variables are appropriately treated as described in the above subsection. Secondly,
we want to examine how the changing distribution of these variables over time could
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explain the declining trend of family migration, particularly in the families with two
college graduates and a college-graduate husband.
The sample period starts from 1982 and ends in 2005. If the regression is esti-
mated by year, the small sample of migrants in each year would make the migration
rate volatile and the estimates become unstable across years. To increase the sample
size and minimize the measurement error, we group the observations, compare and
explain the difference in migration rates across these year groups. Since we look at
a long term trend in migration rate across over thirty years, we could still make a
valid investigation without loss of generality. Three year groups are defined for the
periods of 1982-1990, 1991-1999, and 2000-2005. The samples used in the empirical
analysis are restricted to families where head ages 25-54 and two spouses are both
present at the survey time. The husband in a family should work in two sequent
years and occupation code is available.
Several logit regressions are estimated in this subsection for each type of family
and period. They represent reduced forms of the migration decision functions. The
regression is of the form:
I[Mit = 1] = α+ β1Ageit + β2Sexit + β3NumKidsit + β4Whiteit + β5Blackit
+γ1Wife
Employment
it + γ2Earning Ratioit + γ3Correlationit + γ5Homeit
+D1990 +D2000 + sj + εit , (2.19)
where Mit is a binary variable indicating whether the family has moved across states
in the past year. Each observation represents a family record in period t. All the
demographic characteristic variables for the family are assigned according to the
head’s record.8WifeEmploymentit−1 is the predicted wife’s labor force status prior to mi-
8The head could be the wife. Ideally, we would like to only use the male head. However, the
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gration. Earning Ratioit represents the predicted earning ratio of wife to husband.
Correlationit is the computed correlation of potential earnings from job offers be-
tween husband and wife. In the CPS data, about 20 percent of the married people
reported no occupation. There is no missing occupation code for the respondents
who were employed when they were surveyed. Among the individuals with no oc-
cupation reported, about 80 percent did not work in the pre-survey year either. As
a result, the majority of the individuals without occupation recorded are those who
didn’t work in two adjacent years. For these samples with unobservable occupations,
we assign them a weighted average of the correlation values. D1980, D1990 and D2000
are year group dummies when the model is estimated by using the pooled data over
1981-2005.
2.5.5 Empirical Results
Estimation results for different family types are displayed in Table 2.3. Compar-
ing the findings across the four types of families, we find that families with older
head have lower migration propensity, as expected. The negative effect is significant
at the 5% level for all groups except the families with a highly educated husband.
The migration probability is negatively affected by the number of school age chil-
dren, indicating that the school choice for kids is another major concern that might
discourage migration. For families with two college graduates and a college-graduate
husband, we find strong evidence that pre-migration home ownership impedes migra-
tion. The probability of owning a house has the most striking effect in determining
who is likely to migrate across states borders in these families. Take families with two
female head accounts for 20% of the data. If we exclude it, then we will lose a larger number of
observations. Even though the U.S. is one of the countries with the highest mobility, the migration
rate is still low. For the sake of accuracy in the estimates, we need to make sure the data is large
enough to be statistically meaningful. However, when the sample is restricted to families with a
male head, the main results in this paper still hold.
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college graduates as an example, according to the estimates from the model, a 10%
percentage increase in home ownership from 80% to 88% decreases the migration
probability by about 16% from 2.75% to 2.3%. For families with a college educated
wife and two high school graduates, the effect of home ownership on the migration
decision is barely significant, even though the estimate is still negative. If we look at
the marginal effect of home ownership on migration probability in equation (2.12),
the magnitude of it varies with husband’s earnings. Note that these families usually
have lower asset value of their properties, which is associates with the lower earn-
ings. Therefore, the negative effect of home ownership on migration could be smaller
for these families. Wife’s predicted employment probability enters the regression
with a significant negative coefficient for all four types of families. The effect is much
stronger for the two college graduates and college-wife families. Conditional on other
covariances including the earnings, wife’s labor force attachment plays a significant
role in determining migration. Families with a career oriented wife are less likely to
migrate due to the potential penalty to career break caused by migration, especially
when the wife is a tied-mover within the family. The negative coefficient of earn-
ing ratio of wife to husband provides evidence that if wife’s earnings accounts for a
greater portion of the total family income, the family migration probability is lower.
The estimates of the constructed measure for correlation among gains from migration
of spouses also verify the prediction of the theory model. Even though the measure
for the correlation in wage offers between husband and wife constructed in this paper
only serves as a crude proxy, it still gives us insight into the effects of family ties on
the family migration. There is no strong evidence showing that the gender of a fam-
ily’s head or race significantly affects the family migration. Families with white head
have higher probability to migrate when both spouses are college educated or only
the husband has a college degree. But the estimates are not statistically significant.
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The above estimates also reveal that families of different types display different
decision-making process on migration, as many variables have differential estimates
among those specifications. 9When we investigate how the economic factors explain
the downward trend for each family type, we prefer to use the specific regressions
that truly reflects the migration decision process for that group.
As a robust check of the stability of parameters, we also run the regression by
employing samples of different windows for families where husband has a college
degree. The results are displayed in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. It shows the estimates
are not sensitive to the samples selected for these two types of families.
2.6 Accounting for Changes in the Family Migration Rate
In this subsection, we consider the extent to which changes in the distribution of
socio-economic factors such as earning ratio of wife to husband and home ownership
contributed to the slowing down of family migration in the past 30 years. To accom-
plish this goal, we apply the estimates in the benchmark regression to decompose
the change in the migration rate for each family group. Before we move to that step,
we should recognize that the secular trend in the migration rate could result from
three sources of changes. The first part is due to the changes in the distributions
of individual characteristics over time, as we just mentioned. The second part is
due to the changes in the parameters of the benchmark regression, which indicates
that individual’s preferences have shifted. It is difficult to explain the changes in
individual’s behavior by economic theories. Unobserved or unmeasurable variables
which are not included in the benchmark model could also contribute to the changes
in the trend of migration. In this paper, we only focus on the first source of change.
9In this paper, we primarily focus on the downward trend in migration of different family types,
particularly of the power couples, rather than the gaps of migration rate between these groups from
a cross-section perspective.
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For separating the contribution of measurable characteristics on the outcome vari-
able, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique(Blinder [1973],Oaxaca[1973]) has
become an standard methodology in the past decades. However, the Blinder-Oaxaca
technique, which originally developed from linear regressions, cannot be directly
applied to non-linear regressions with a binary dependent variable (Fairlie [2005,
2007]). Since the outcome variable we investigate here is a binary choice variable
on migration, we would adopt the non-linear decomposition technique developed by
Fairlie.10
I perform a decomposition of the gap in migration rate over the period of 1980s to
2000s for all of the four family types by using the parameter estimates obtained from
the pulled regression of each group. The results for the decomposition are displayed
in Table 2.6. First, we illustrate the results for families with two college graduates.
When the samples are aggregated into three periods, there is an 1% drop in the
average migration rate from 1980s to 1990s, and a 0.57% drop from 1990s to 2000s.
The included variables explain 88.6% of the total gap between 1980s and 1990s,and
82.1% of the gap between 1990s and 2000s. But when we look at the contribution
of a specific variable, we find that it may have different amounts of contribution
in different periods. The probability of owning a house only explains 2.2% of the
decrease in the migration rate in the 1990s. However, it becomes the most important
factor that causes the decrease in the migration rate in the 2000s. The contribution
is 71.8%, which is quite material. This finding is in line with the phenomenon
that home ownership for this group of family has been increasing significantly since
the mid 1990s. In Figure 2.4, it shows that the home ownership of families with
two college graduates increases from about 83% in the 1990s to 88% in the 2000s.
10The difference between the standard Blinder-Oaxaca technique and the method extended by
Fairlie is extensively explored and discussed in Fairlie[2005].
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Figure 2.4: The Mean Values of the Explanatory Variables over the Decades of 1980,
1990, and 2000.
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Wife’s labor force attachment, measured by the predicted wife’s employment status,
contributes to the decline of migration rate in distinct ways in different periods. The
change of wife’s labor force participation decisions accounts for roughly 15% of the
total decrease in the migration rate from 1980s to 1990s. In contrast, the estimate of
its contribution from 1990s to 2000s is -38.7%, which indicates that this factor should
actually increase the family migration between the 1990s and 2000s. The migration
rate still falls between these two decades, as we observed, since the negative effect
of this factor is partially offset by other environment changes, such as the home
ownership increase, which contributes to the decrease of migration rate in a quite
opposite direction. Not surprisingly, when we look at the secular changes in predicted
probability of wife’s employment, there is a break-up of the long term upward trend
in the 1990s. The slowdown in the growth of female labor supply between the 1990s
and 2000s is also documented in Blau and Kahn [2007]. The Earning ratio of wife to
husband has greater contributions in the 1990s than in the 2000s. The contribution
of this variable is 19.3% in the 2000s, whereas the magnitude of the contrition in
the 1990s is as twice larger as that number. It reflects the fact that the increase in
the earning ratio of wife to husband is more substantial between 1980s and 1990s.
The change of age structure in the population consistently explains about 20% of
the decrease in the migration rate of two college graduates couples across the three
decades. Due to the ageing of the baby boom generation, the average age of the family
head continually increases in the past 30 years, which leads to a lower migration rate.
In comparison with the variables discussed above, the contribution of the correlation
in the gains from migration between wife and husband is small, which is only 7.5%
from 1980s to 1990s, then almost disappears in the period of 1990s-2000s. Even
though the magnitude of the contribution is immaterial, the changing pattern is
consistent with the findings that there is only a significant drop of the correlation
51
measure in the 1990s. Of the other explanatory variables, the head’s gender and race
only account for a small portion of the total change in the migration rate over the
three periods. The number of kids under 18 years old firstly increases the migration
rate in the 1980s to 1990s, and then decreases the migration rate over the 1990s to
2000s with a slightly larger effects.
Overall, for the variables that we are primarily interested in, the decomposition
estimates for the families with a college-graduate husband are similar to those of the
two college graduates. There is also a dramatic change of the contribution from the
home ownership probabilities across time(-11.6% in the 1980s-1990s and 50.3% in the
1990s-2000s). Both Wife’s employment propensity and earning ratio between wife
and husband show stronger effects in explaining the slowdown of migration rate in
the 1980s-1990s and in the 1990s-2000s. Another interesting results are revealed by
the estimates for state dummies. For both families with two college graduates and
a college-graduate husband, differences across the last two decades in changes in the
state effects expedite the migration rather than slow it down. Again, the negative
effects are compensated by the positive effects from other explanatory variables.
A possible explanation for this result is that the development of high technology
industry and the geographic concentration of industry during the 1990s and 2000s
promote the migration of labor into the states where they possess the skills demanded
in those highly concentrated industries.
The results reported in Table 2.6 also shows that the explanatory variables have
weak powers in explaining the migration patterns over time for the families with a
college wife or two high school graduates. However, as we have seen, the migration
rates for these two types of families are much lower than the families of two college
graduates and a college husband. The family economic status, partially determined
by educational background, indicates that they may have lower sensitivity to migrate
52
in response to economic incentives. In the families with a college wife, even though
the wife has higher education, but because women are usually less career oriented and
less mobile than man, and the college wife may have higher bargaining power over
their high-school graduated husband, this type of family could have quite different
decision making process regarding to migration. Over the three decades that are
included in the empirical analysis, the long term trend of migration rate for these
two types of family barely changes. If we look at the coefficient estimates in the
baseline regressions for these families, it is not hard to figure out that many of them
are not statistically significant, which would also impair the decomposition analysis.
As a robust check of the decomposition results obtained from the pooled sample
across three decades, we also calculate the decompositions using coefficients of each
decade for both families with two college graduates and a college graduate husband.
The results are reported in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, respectively. The decompositions
for families with two college graduates by using different sets of coefficients are sta-
ble. In comparison, the decomposition estimates for families with a college graduate
husband are more sensitive to the coefficients used. But most of the variations are
due to the imprecision of many of the coefficient estimates in the logit regressions
which are based on shorter sample periods. The sample size of families with power
husband is less than one third of the sample size of families with power couples. Also,
the number of migrants are small because of the lower migration rate.
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3. YOUTH COHORT SIZE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
3.1 Related Literature
Young workers, as a demographic group, are lacking in working experience in
the early stage of their careers. They are more likely to experiment with different
types of jobs or employers to find a good match. Therefore, compared with prime
age workers, young workers have a higher probability to be separated from a job.
Moreover, the youth are less confined to family obligations before they get married.
They are more mobile across jobs and locations. Instability is another important
factor that contributes to the higher unemployment rate of young workers. As the
age structure of the population shifts toward or away from the youth, the potential
effect of changing population composition on the aggregate unemployment rates is
still an open question.
The baby boom after World War II provides a natural experiment to investigate
the effects of the change in demographic composition on labor market outcomes.
When the baby boomers enter the labor market, the proportion of young workers in
the labor force significantly increases. Focusing on the total effect of youth cohort
size, many authors predicate and confirm that the baby boom and the subsequent
baby bust would push up the aggregate unemployment rate in the 1970s first, then
pull it down in the 1980s and the 1990s. (Perry [1970], Flaim [1979], Gordon [1982],
Flaim [1990], and Shimer [1998].) The similar time pattern in the trends of youth
share and aggregate unemployment rate leads many economists to conjecture that
there is a causality rather than just a coincidence between the two variables. However,
studies with a time series analysis fail to control for other possible macro shocks
which may also affect the decrease in the aggregate unemployment rate, such as oil
56
price or government policies. Therefore, these analysis can hardly establish a causal
relationship between the aggregate unemployment rate and youth cohort size.
Korenman and Neumark [2000] construct a panel data set collected from 15
OECD countries in the period of 1970-1994. The panel feature of the data allows
them to control for country fixed effects and year effects in the regression. Their
findings are consistent with the previous ‘cohort crowding’ literature and the studies
which employ time series analysis. The estimated elasticity is about 0.3 and is
statistically significant.
Shimer [2001] also applies the panel data method to investigate the the rela-
tionship between the annual state unemployment rates and state youth share in the
United States from 1978 to 1996. The more disaggregate unemployment rates of
different age groups make it possible to examine the impact of young cohort size
on both the aggregate and age-group specific unemployment rates.1 The indirect
marginal effects of youth cohort size on the unemployment rates of different groups
are estimated separately in this study. Surprisingly, Shimer [2001] shows that an
increase in the youth share in the working age population in a state will decrease
the aggregate unemployment rate with an elasticity of -2 in that state. Moreover,
1There are two aspects of the effects of youth cohort size on the unemployment rate. First, the
aggregate unemployment rate for a region is calculated as a weighted average of unemployment
rates of various age cohorts. The size of each age cohort is considered as the weight. A change
in the weights would lead to a change in the aggregate unemployment rate. This is recognized
as the direct composition effect of cohort size. Second, workers in different age cohorts might be
imperfectly substitutable. The increase in the number of workers in certain age cohort could have
differential impacts on the job opportunities of workers in different age cohorts. This is the indirect
effect of cohort size on the unemployment rate. Suppose ui is the aggregate unemployment rate
and wji refers to the ratio of the labor force in age cohort j to the overall labor force summed over
all age cohorts, then ui is given by
ui =
J∑
j=1
wjiu
j
i , (3.1)
where J is the number of age cohorts or groups in region i. For ease of illustration, we can simply
assume that there are two broad age cohorts in the labor force, the young and the old. Then the
aggregate unemployment rate in region i becomes
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he finds that the increase of youth population not only reduces the unemployment
rate of the youth, but also more substantially reduces the unemployment rates of
the prime age workers. Foote [2007] updates Shimer [2001]’s data to 2005. He finds
that the negative correlation between youth cohort size and unemployment rate does
not hold true for the U.S. data set, which covers a much longer time period. He at-
tributes it to the presence of spacial correlation in the state-level data. Even though
the estimates, obtained by correcting the error terms through various specifications,
become positive, none of them are significant. Foote [2007] concludes the paper by
doubting the reliability of the regional panel data in macro-analysis. Unlike Foote
[2007], we split all the available data from 1978 to 2008 into two sub-periods. In this
way, we could identify the breaking point in the estimates. Foote [2007] points out
the instability of the estimates, but he does not provide further discussion on the
relationship between the youth cohort size and unemployment rate.
ui = w
y
i u
y
i + w
o
i u
o
i = w
y
i (u
y
i − uoi ) + uoi . (3.2)
For the simplest case, if age-specific unemployment rates uy and uo are unaffected by the change
in the cohort sizes, measured by wy and wo, then the marginal effect of youth cohort size on the
aggregate unemployment rate is
∂ui
∂wyi
= uyi − uoi > 0, (3.3)
since uyi > u
o
o.
With only the direct effect considered, the aggregate unemployment rate ui would increase along
with the youth cohort size wy. Once the indirect effect is accounted for, equations (??) and (??)
are transformed into the following forms,
ui = w
y
i u
y
i (w
y
i ) + w
o
i u
o
i (w
y
i ) = w
y
i (u
y
i (w
y
i )− uoi (wyi )) + uoi (wyi ) (3.4)
∂ui
∂wy
= [uyi − uoi ] + wyi [
∂uyi (w
y
i )
∂wyi
− ∂u
o
i (w
y
i )
∂wyi
] +
∂uoi (w
y
i )
∂wyi
(3.5)
In equation (3.5), the marginal effect of youth cohort size on the total unemployment rate consists
of two parts. The term uyi −uoi is the direct effect specified in equation (3.5). The remaining terms
represent the indirect effect. As a priori, the signs of both ∂u
y
i (w
y
i )
∂wyi
and ∂u
o
i (w
y
i )
∂wyi
are uncertain, as is
the difference between the two terms. If ∂u
y
i (w
y
i )
∂wyi
>
∂uoi (w
y
i )
∂wyi
> 0, then the total effect outweighs the
direct effect.
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The most recently relevant work that investigates the effects of cohort size on
labor market outcomes is given by Jaimovich and Siu [2009]. Instead of studying
the cohort effects on the unemployment rate, they focus on the consequences of
demographic change on business cycle volatility. They calculate several measures for
the business cycle volatility and use the panel method which is very similar to that
of Shimer [2001] on G7 countries from the mid-1960s to 1999. They find that an
increase in the share of volatile-age labor force2 significantly increases the business
cycle volatility.
3.2 Temporal Correlation between Unemployment Rate and Youth Cohort Size
3.2.1 The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Unemployment Rate in the U.S. and
OECD: A Revision
The baseline regression is the same as Shimer [2001]:
log unempit = α+ β log youthshareit + δi + γt + it (3.6)
where unempit and youthshareit are the unemployment rate and the youth share
for state i in year t, respectively. The youthshareit is defined as the ratio of the
population with the ages of 16-24 and ages of 16-64. It measures the youth cohort
size in the population. The youth share is calculated by using the population instead
of the labor force to circumvent the potential endogeniety caused by the choices of
labor force participation.3 β measures the elasticity of the unemployment rate to
changes in the youth share. δi is the state fixed effect and γt is the year effect that
2The volatile-age labor force in this paper is defined as the population share of group with age
16-29 and 60-64.
3But the results presented here are robust when the youth share is defined as the youth cohort
size in the labor force.
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absorbs nationwide macroeconomic shocks. Table 3.1 illustrates the estimates of
the coefficient for youth share by using data sets from two different sample periods
by age group.4 The first subsample is the same as in Shimer [2001], from 1978 to
1996. The second subsample is from later years, from 1997-2008. The second and
fourth column in Table 3.1 correspond to IV estimates with lagged birth rates as the
instrumental variable for youth share. Before 1996, the estimates of β are consistent
with those in Shimer [2001], which are significantly negative. The estimates for
prime age workers are larger than those for young workers aged 16-19 and 20-24. By
contrast, β becomes positive and statistically significant for the youngest age group
after 1997. The IV estimates have the same signs as OLS estimates, but differ in
their magnitudes.
Shimer [2001] develops a theory model to explain his empirical findings in 1978-
1996. The model is a modification of the standard search-and-match model in the
labor literature. The model incorporates the concept of “trade externality” proposed
by Diamond [1982], which predicts that the hiring cost of firms is lower in regions
where there is a larger portion of young workers in the labor force. Because young
workers are more likely to be unmatched or mismatched to the employers, they have
greater incentive to relocate. Firms are attracted by these more active markets and
therefore generate more job vacancies. Both of the young and old workers could ben-
efit from the job creation of new firms. Once the negative indirect effect dominates
the positive direct effect, the aggregate unemployment rate may even decrease. The
discrepancy in the estimates across different time periods in the U.S. raises ques-
tions to the explanation based on search and match theories. If capital continually
flows to areas with a high share of young workers and creates more job opportunities
there, then the negative relationship between the youth share and unemployment
4Table 3.2 shows the results obtained by using OECD data.
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rates found in the 1980s and 1990s should have continued through the 2000s, contra-
dictory to the empirical evidence. Instead, proposes another explanation that may
help us to understand the contradiction. We show that the non-random sampling of
the youth cohort size in the data plays an important role in the inconsistency of the
estimated elasticities in both the United States and OECD countries.
Table 3.1: The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Unemployment Rate in the
U.S., 1978-2008.
1978-1996 1997-2008
OLS IV OLS IV
16-64 -1.722** -1.646*** 0.458 1.253***
(0.236) (0.268) (0.371) (0.400)
16-19 -1.359*** -1.008*** 0.510* 1.213***
(0.222) (0.248) (0.307) (0.367)
20-24 -1.914*** -2.049*** 0.362 0.880*
(0.254) (0.279) (0.365) (0.452)
25-34 -1.903*** -2.001*** 0.324 1.224**
(0.279) (0.351) (0.483) (0.489)
35-44 -2.274*** -1.988*** -0.063 0.625
(0.320) (0.380) (0.423) (0.496)
45-54 -2.686*** -2.734*** 1.310** 1.849**
(0.350) (0.439) (0.303) (0.482)
55-64 -2.603*** -3.272*** -0.403 0.597
(0.444) (0.491) (0.589) (0.679)
1 New-West Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.
2 Instrumental variables for youth share include lagged birthrate, year and state dum-
mies.
3 *** significant at 1 percent level. ** significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10
percent level.
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Table 3.2: The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Unemployment Rate in
OECD Countries, 1971-2009.
1978-1996 1997-2008
OLS IV OLS IV
15-64 -1.219** -1.620*** -0.178 -0.074
(0.437) (0.446) (0.401) (0.425)
15-24 -1.394*** -1.820*** 0.009 0.152
(0.446) (0.457) (0.392) (0.392)
25-34 -2.074*** -2.308** -0.304 -0.183
(0.540) (0.554) (0.463) (0.484)
35-44 -1.315*** -1.541*** -0.722 -0.703
(0.531) (0.531) (0.425) (0.461)
45-54 -0.785 -0.857* -0.463** -0.454
(0.529) (0.522) (0.394) (0.437)
55-64 -0.898 -0.640 -0.882** -0.722*
(0.581) (0.585) (0.396) (0.433)
1 New-West Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.
2 Instrumental variables for youth share include lagged birthrate, year and state dum-
mies.
3 *** significant at 1 percent level. ** significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10
percent level.
We next compare the coefficient estimates of the youth share in different model
specifications. Table 3.3 presents the estimates from four model specifications in two
time periods in the United States. Specification (1) and (2) are unconditional models
without controlling for year effects, while specification (3) and (4) are conditional
models with year dummies included in the regression. Specification (1) is the pooled
OLS regression. In specification (2) and (4), we control for the state fixed effect.
Column 1 to 4 report the estimates for the period of 1978-1996. There is a notable
difference in the estimates between the conditional and unconditional model. It
shows that benchmark negative estimates reported in Shimer [2001] are driven by
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the inclusion of year dummies in the regression. In the second period of 1997-2008,
which is updated in this paper, the variation in the estimated coefficients of youth
share across these different specifications are reduced. Estimates from unconditional
and conditional models are quite similar. Table 3.4 reports the estimates for equation
(3.6) by applying OECD country panels from 1971 to 2009. To make it comparable
with the estimates from the United States, we also divide the whole OECD sample
into two sub-samples with time frames of 1971-1995 and 1996-2009. As shown in the
table, in the period of 1978-1996, the positive effect of youth cohort size reported in
earlier panel studies and in Table 3.2 of this paper is also driven by the year effects.
3.2.2 Conditional and Unconditional Marginal Effect of Youth Cohort Size
There are two ways to identify the marginal effect of youth cohort size on the
unemployment rate when using the panel data: conditional or unconditional on year
effects. The findings described in the previous subsection indicate that estimates
from the two models differ significantly both in sign and magnitude across different
panels. To provide a more formal theoretical explanation on the difference between
unconditional and conditional model, consider the regression specified in equation
(3.6). For simplicity, we use y, X1, X2 to denote the unemployment rate, youth
share, and the set of year dummies, respectively. Given the assumption5 that
E[ε|X1, X2] = 0, (3.7)
the mean of y conditional on the youth share and year effects is given by,
E[y|X1, X2] = X1β1 +X2β2. (3.8)
5Apparently, the error terms in this setting are autocorrelated and heterogeneous, but it would
not affect the basic results developed here by relaxing this assumption.
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To obtain the unconditional marginal effect of youth cohort size on unemployment
rate, we should integrate out the year effects represented byX2 in the above equation,
E[y|X1] =
∫
E[y|X1, X2]g(X2|X1)dX2
=
∫
(X1β1 +X2β2)g(X2|X1)dX2
=
∫
X1β1g(X2|X1)dX2 +
∫
X2β2g(X2|X1)dX2
= X1β1 + E[X2|X1]β2. (3.9)
The difference between the conditional and unconditional mean of y is given by the
term of E[X2|X1]β2. Notice that E[X2|X1] is a function of X1. To have consistent
estimates of the marginal effect of X1 on y obtained from equations (3.8) and (3.9),
E[X2|X1] should be constant. That is, X1 is uncorrelated with X2. If E[X2|X1]
is not a constant, but depending upon X1, then the estimates will vary across the
conditional and unconditional model. Whether the estimates from the conditional
model are reliable depends on the robustness of the correlation between X1 and X2.
If it is robust, then the estimate from the unconditional model without controlling X2
is biased. The estimate is biased downward or upward depending upon how X1 and
X2 is correlated. In such cases, adding X2 in the regression is justifiable. However,
if the relationship between these two variables varies over time, any inference made
from the estimates obtained by including X2 could be misleading if applying to
different periods. In the specific problem we are discussing in this study, the positive
temporal correlation between youth share and unemployment rate might be just
a coincidence in the period of 1978-1996 in the U.S and 1971-1995 in the OECD
countries. However, the stability of estimates from the conditional model requires a
random sampling of the data.
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Figure 3.1: The Trend of Unemployment Rate, Youth Share and Oil Price in the
U.S.
In the age composition of population in the U.S., there is a dramatic change
due to the baby boom generation who were born in the years from 1946 to 1964.6
Panel A in Figure 3.1 plots the national trend of youth share and unemployment
rate in the U.S. in the postwar period. Youth share starts to rise in 1955 and peaks
in 1978, from a national average of about 19% to 27%. From the end of the 1970s
to the mid 1990s, there is a steady decline of youth share due to the baby bust.
Youth share has remained at a plateau around a level of 19%-20% since 1996. The
graph also shows that within the period of 1978-1996, the aggregate unemployment
rate experiences a notable fall as well. There are two business cycles within this
period. The average unemployment rate in the first cycle is much higher than that
in the second one. It is unclear whether the positively temporal correlation in the
youth share and unemployment rate in the period of 1978-1996 is a causality or a
coincidence, which is the difficulty encountered in studies with time series analysis.
If it is just a coincidence, the non-sampling problem would arise. Unfortunately, the
baby boom is a non-replicable historical event. We are not able to test this spurious
6According to U.S. Census Bureau (January 3, 2001). ”Oldest Baby Boomers Turn 60!”
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Figure 3.2: The Trend of Unemployment Rate and Youth Share in the OECD Coun-
tries.
correlation in another similar baby boom period. There is some evidence showing
that the decreasing unemployment rate might be caused by other macroeconomic
factors. For instance, it is observed that oil shocks are also historically correlated
with economic recessions in the U.S. (Mork [1989], Ferderer [1996], Hamilton [1996]
and Hooker [1996]) Panel B of Figure 3.1 shows the time series for the oil price
and unemployment rate of the U.S. from 1946 to 2008. After 1970s, it reveals a
closer correlation between oil price and unemployment rate. The trend of oil price
graphically fits the trend of unemployment rate much better than the youth share,
but with a one year lag.
Figure 3.2 presents a similar set of time series of aggregate unemployment rate
and youth share for 15 OECD countries. The baby boom is not a unique demographic
phenomenon in the United States. Actually, WWII brought most western countries
a baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s. There is more variation in the youth cohort
size across countries. The proportion of youth cohort in the population starts to fall
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in the early 1970s in countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland,
Netherlands, and Finland. The baby boom in these countries begins immediately
after the war. In other OECD countries, such as Germany, Italy and U.K., which
are damaged greatly by the war, birth rates only increase when the economy starts
to recover several years after the war. Therefore there is a lag in the falling trend
of youth cohort size in these countries. Overall, in 1970-1994, the annual average of
youth share in OECD countries decreases, while the annual average of unemployment
rate increases. The two business cycles that occurred around the early 1980s and
1990s match those observed in the United States. But in OECD countries, the overall
unemployment rate was much higher in the second cycle in the period of 1970-1995.
If the declining youth share should decrease the unemployment rate according to
the ‘cohort crowding effect’, then the graph demonstrates that there must be other
factors that substantially affect the unemployment rate.
In sum, in Shimer [2001] and Korenman and Neumark [2000], the consequences of
demographic change in the age structure for the unemployment rate are investigated
in a period when the youth cohort size falls significantly. The decline of youth share
caused by exogenous historical reasons is spuriously correlated with the temporal
variation of unemployment rate. Regardless of whether the correlation is positive or
negative, the exercise of including year dummies in the fixed effect model is subject
to a non-random sampling problem. The analysis does not imply that the inclusion
of year dummies in the fixed effect model is inappropriate; it simply illustrates under
what circumstances should we be careful about the consistency of the estimates
across different specifications, as well as the implicit random sampling assumption.
3.3 Data
Part I - United States
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1. Unemployment Rate: Unemployment rate data by state by age group are from
the LAUS program in the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data cover from 1976 to
2009. 1976 is the first year that comparable unemployment rate data across states
are available.
2. Demographic Data: Population by age from 1970 to 2009 are from Census
Bureau Population Estimates.
3. Birth Rate and Death Rate are collected from historical Statistical Abstract of
United States. The lagged birth rates from 1954 to 1992 are used as the Instrumental
Variable for Youth Share in 1978-2008. Birth rate, death rate, together with the
population by age are used to restore the migration data for every state in each year.
Part II - OECD Countries
1. Unemployment Rates by age groups and Demographic distribution are ob-
tained from OECD. Stat Extracts. http: // stats. oecd. org/ Index. aspx
2. Birthrate are collected from various issues of International Historical Statistics:
1970-2005.
Part III - Ipums Census (1980,1990 and 2000).
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Empirical Strategies
Because the estimates obtained from conditional model, which controls for year
effects by including year dummies, are not robust in different cross sections and
sample periods, there is no prediction power of the conditional model. We next
turn to the unconditional model for more reliable and consistent estimates. In this
subsection, we explore the unconditional marginal effect of youth cohort size on
unemployment rate. For the strategies proposed in this subsection, we primarily
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Figure 3.3: Correlation between State Average of Unemployment Rate and Youth
Share in the U.S.
focus on the U.S. data. The sample size of the OECD countries data is too small to
be statistically significant at any level in the cross-sectional analysis.
As a first attempt, we average the youth share and unemployment rate over
different sample periods for each state. Figure 3.3 presents the scatters and fitted
lines of the averages for the aggregate unemployment rate and youth share across 49
states. Panel A and B are for the periods of 1978-1996 and 1996-2008, respectively.
The fitted line indicates the direction of the correlation between the two variables
in each period. Comparing the two panels, we find that the fitted line in Panel B
is downward sloping. However, it is driven by four states which are located in the
right corner of the graphs, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Utah. The
former three states are contiguous farm states in the mid-west, with large agriculture
sectors and low population density. Specifically, there are more than 50 percent of
the population living in the rural area and working on farms in these three states.
On the one hand, the unemployment rates there are persistently lower than most
other states. The development of healthy agricultural industry and enriched natural
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resources make these states less vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and economic
recessions. On the other hand, birth rates are higher in these states all year-round.
When youth share in most of the other states drops to around 20 percent, it remains
high in these same states. High demand for labor on farms might be one of the
reasons for the high birth rates. Another state with the highest birth rate is Utah,
which is recognized by its highly religious homogeneity of Mormonism. Also, the
unemployment rate in Utah is much lower compared with the national average. The
attractiveness of youth to the firms, according to the basic thought conveyed in
the the theory developed in Shimer [2001], might be one of the possible reasons.
Nevertheless, as shown in the figure, Utah is an outlier far apart from the bulk of
the other states. Utah’s mode is hardly replicable for other states. We are more
interested in the more general cases of other states for the sake of providing an
explanation applied to the more general situations.
We propose two strategies to deal with the possible outlier effects. Firstly, we
drop the states which are likely to be outliers in the analysis and revise the cross
sectional evidence on the relationship between averages of unemployment rate and
youth share for the remaining states. Secondly, we conduct a population weighted
regression analysis. Any outlier effects would be reduced by the population weights.
The cross-sectional analysis above is still hard to build a causal relationship for
the unemployment rate and youth cohort size. Even though the year effects are
controlled for by taking averages, state specific characteristics are not eliminated,
such as state taxes or benefit policies, industrial mix, demographic composition in
ethnicity or average education attainment, etc. Consider a state with a higher average
unemployment rate in a certain time period: it is possible that the state has a higher
share of employment in sectors with higher unemployment rates, due to the negative
national demand shocks. At the same time, the youth share is relatively high in that
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state because of the higher lagged birthrate. The question is whether the industrial
mix or the high youth share is the main source of the high unemployment rate, or
whether the two effects coexist. This is the main drawback of the cross sectional
analysis.
In order to remove the state fixed effect in determining the relationship between
youth cohort size and unemployment rate, we propose the following statistical pro-
cedures to construct a pseudo panel for the United States. In this pseudo panel, the
chronology of the original data set is disrupted. We turn our attention away from
the conditional model because we have concern that the estimates could be driven
by the spurious temporal correlation between youth cohort size and unemployment
rate. In our alternative unconditional model, we intend to eliminate this possibility.
1. In each sample period, we shuffle the sets of observations across years and
divide these randomized data into two year groups for each individual state. There-
fore, the combination of years in each year group will be different across states. By
randomizing the order of the data for each state, we could avoid the effects of the
temporal trends of youth cohort size and unemployment rate.
2. Calculate the average unemployment rate and youth share for each state in
each year group within a sample period.
3. For each state, take the difference of the averages in unemployment rate and
youth share between two year groups.
4. Each practice from Step 1 to Step 3 is considered as an attempt. Run the
OLS estimation by using the values obtained from Step 3 for each attempt. Record
the estimated coefficient and the standard errors.
5. Repeat Step 1 to Step 4 for 10,000 times7.
6. Plot the distribution of the estimated coefficients obtained from these 10,000
7The results show that it makes little difference to have more attempts.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation between State Average of Unemployment Rate and Youth
Share in the U.S.-Exclude outliers.
attempts.
3.4.2 Cross Sectional Evidence for the U.S.
In Figure 3.4, Panel A and B present the the scatters and fitted lines for the
state average of aggregate unemployment rate and youth share after we drop those
four states mentioned above. As the figure illustrates, there is a positive correlation
between unemployment rate and youth share in both periods. In order to show
the indirect effects of youth share on the age group specific unemployment rates,
Panel A to Panel F in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 also graphically link the age group
specific unemployment rate with the youth share in two periods of 1978-1996 and
1997-2008. Panel A and B present the results for the two youngest groups. Panel
C to F are for four population groups aged from 25 to 64. The fitted line for the
unemployment rate and youth share rotates rightward when we go through from
the panels for younger age groups to older age groups in both periods. The positive
relationship between state averages of unemployment rate and youth share diminishes
and becomes negative for the eldest cohort.
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Figure 3.5: State Average of Unemployment rate and Youth Share by Age Group in
the U.S. in 1978-1996 - Excluding Outliers.
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Figure 3.6: State Average of Unemployment Rate and Youth Share by Age Group
in the U.S. in 1997-2008 - Excluding Outliers.
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In Table 3.5, we present the estimated effects of average youth cohort size on
average unemployment rates obtained from regressions for the period of 1978-1996.
Column 1 and 2 report the results when all of the 49 states are included. Column 3
and 4 give the estimates when Utah is dropped out. In Column 2 and 4, we replace
the average youth share by the ones predicted by the lagged birthrates in order
to control for the potential endogeneity. Of particular interest, we also investigate
the relationship between youth share and age group specific unemployment rates
in these regressions. Even though the estimates are largely insignificant due to
the small sample size and high variations in unemployment rate and youth share
among the 49 states, the changes in the coefficients reveal a similar pattern as we
move along these columns from younger to older groups. The estimated effects of
youth share on unemployment rates are getting smaller and smaller. It indicates
that the youth cohort size has differential effects on the unemployment rates for
different age groups, consistent with the hypothesis that workers of different ages
are imperfect substitutes. When we compare OLS estimates with IV estimates,
obtained by using the lagged birthrate as the instrumental variable, we find that the
OLS estimates are much smaller in magnitude than the IV estimates. It indicates
that the endogeneity problem is indeed present. In addition, across the years, Table
3.6 shows that the endogeneity problem becomes much stronger in the latter period
of 1997-2008. After we drop Utah from the analysis, both the OLS and IV estimates
become more positive. The change in the estimates confirms the previous conjecture
that Utah is a state that drives down the possible crowding effects of youth share.
The IV estimates for the youngest age group of 16-19 are statistically significant at
a 5% level with or without Utah included, as shown in Column 2 and Column 4.
The magnitude of these estimates is also of economic significance. For the majority
of states in the U.S., it implies that a state with 5 percent higher youth share in the
79
population, projected by the higher birthrate back to 16-24 years ago, is associated
with a 0.3-0.5 percent higher unemployment rate for the youngest workers aged 16-19
in the labor force.
Groups (3) and (4) in Panel A and B of Table 3.5 reports the results of population
weighted regressions. In group (4), the state of Utah is also excluded in the regression.
Except for the oldest groups with age 45-54 and 55-64, the estimates turn positive,
which further demonstrates the presence of outlier effects.
As a robust check for the above results, we also apply these specifications on
samples across an approximate 5 or 10 year interval. For example, for samples with
a 10 years interval, the time span for each sub-period is from 1978-1989, 1990-1999,
and 2000-2008. Results are largely similar even though they are not reported in this
paper.
3.4.3 Results after Controlling for State Fixed Effects
Figure 3.7 presents the distributions of the estimates for the impact of youth
share on the aggregate unemployment rate, in two separate sample periods from our
alternative procedures. The mean of the estimates are about 0.15 in both periods.
But the variance is larger in the second period. Figure 3.8 shows the distributions
of estimates by age groups in 1978-1996. The mean values of these estimates for the
group of 16-19 and 20-24 is the largest among six age groups, which are 0.15 and
0.22. The means are shifting to the right as we move toward the older age group.
The changing pattern of the estimated effects of youth cohort size on differen age
groups is preserved. In 1997-2008, the variance of these estimates enlarges for most
age groups. But the positive effects of youth cohort size on unemployment rate still
exists among younger age groups, as shown in Figure 3.9. There is one exception
though: the effect of youth cohort size on the unemployment rate of the age group of
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Figure 3.7: Distributions of the OLS Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Aggregate Unemployment Rate in the U.S.
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Figure 3.8: Distributions of the OLS Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1978-1996.
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Figure 3.9: Distributions of the OLS Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on
the Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1997-2008
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Figure 3.10: Distributions of the IV Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on the
Aggregate Unemployment Rate in the U.S.
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Figure 3.11: Distributions of the IV estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on the
Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1978-1996.
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Figure 3.12: Distributions of the IV Estimates for the Impact of Youth Share on the
Age-Group Specific Unemployment Rate in the U.S. in 1997-2008.
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45-54 is positive. The IV estimates described in Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11 and Figure
3.12 are quite similar to the OLS estimates, which indicates the temporal migration
does not really impair the estimated effects of youth cohort size.
Table 3.7 reports the composition of the estimates according to the sign and
statistical significance. We have classified the estimates of coefficient into four cat-
egories: significantly positive, insignificantly positive, significantly negative and in-
significantly negative. The numbers in each column corresponds to the counts out of
10,000 for each category and age group. For younger age groups, the proportion of
positive estimates strongly dominates the negative estimates. For instance, in 10,000
attempts for the age group of 16-19 in the period of 1978-1996, 7246 estimates are
positive while only 2574 estimates are negative. As we move from the youngest to the
oldest age group, we find that the total counts of positive estimates are monotonically
decreasing. In contrast, the total counts of negative estimates are increasing along
with the age. For the oldest group of 54-64, negative estimates become the majority
from the 1000 attempts. In either case, the nonsignificant estimates outweigh the
significant ones in total numbers for each age group. Again, IV estimates presented
in the bottom panel in Table 3.7 are quite close to the OLS estimates.
The above results show that after controlling for state fixed effects by taking
difference between two average values obtained from a randomized data set, the de-
caying pattern of the estimated marginal effect of youth share on the unemployment
rate still exist. It is relatively strongest and positive for the youngest age group.
However, due to large variance of the randomized data for only 49 states, the overall
effects of youth share on the unemployment rate is weak.
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3.4.4 Inference from OECD Countries
We investigate the cross-sectional analysis by employing the OECD countries
data, which is another source of data used in the previous literature about the rela-
tionship between youth cohort size and unemployment rate. In 1971-1995, we also
find some evidence for a clockwise rotating pattern of the correlation between youth
cohort size and country averages of unemployment rate by age group in 15 OECD
countries. The younger the age group, the greater the positive relationship between
unemployment rate and youth share. This pattern could be explained by the im-
perfect substitutability between workers in different age groups. The youth cohort
size has strongest effects on the youngest group since young workers are perfect sub-
stitutes for young workers themselves. The substitutability between the youngest
workers and other age group workers declines as the the age of other workers in-
creases. However, even though we find a similar pattern in OECD countries, the
correlation is still positive for the oldest groups with age of 45-64. In contrast, in the
cross states data collected from the U.S., the sign of the correlation is negative for
the oldest group. The rotation of the fitted lines among different age groups are more
dramatic in the U.S. There are two possible explanations for the discrepancy. Firstly,
young workers in more aggregated sections, such as countries, are still more likely to
be substitutes to the old workers. However, across states within a country, migration
cost is substantially lowered and young workers could migrate away from the high
youth unemployment rate state. Therefore, prime age workers in states with high
youth unemployment rates face less competition from the younger group. Secondly,
it is more likely that the high unemployment rates in some OECD countries such
as Ireland, United States, Canada, and Netherland are not related to their higher
youth cohort sizes during the period of 1971-1995. It is the unobservable country-
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specific characteristics that lead a recession of the economy. At the country level, this
probability is much higher. The macro policies would be more heterogenous across
countries than within countries. Also, these country-specific policies may change
over time. Neither state or year fixed effects could fully control this kind of varia-
tion. Therefore, even though the substitutability of the young workers for other age
group of workers decreases, the gap in the unemployment rates between higher and
lower youth cohort size countries doesn’t diminish. In the second period of 1995-2009,
the relative size of youth cohort barely changes, but there is no notable correlation
between the unemployment rate and youth cohort size in the OECD countries based
upon the cross-sectional analysis. All in all, the cross-sectional evidence is not stable
in the OECD countries across the time.
3.4.5 Robust Checks by Using Micro Data in the U.S.
All the analysis in the previous subsections is based on the aggregate data. The
evidence from unconditional model by using data in the U.S. suggests that increase
in youth share has a positive effect on the unemployment rate. In this subsection, we
investigate whether the results also hold true if we employ micro level data. For this
end, we construct data from the IPUMS for the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census.
We estimate
P (Unemploymentij = 1) = φ(Xβ + γ1Yj + γ2Uj + εij) (3.10)
where Unemploymentij is an indicator variable showing the individual is unemployed
or not. X is a vector of standard control variables for individual characteristics,
including age, gender, marriage status, race, educational attainment and home own-
ership. Yj and Uj are two aggregate variables indicating the youth cohort size and
overall unemployment rate in the state j which the individual resides in. We are
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interested at the estimates of γ1 since it is the marginal effect of the youth cohort
size on individual’s unemployment probability. The model is firstly estimated con-
ditional on individuals who are in the labor force. Since the youth cohort size and
unemployment rate may also affect the labor force participation decisions of workers,
if the cohort crowding effect exists, then some of the workers, who find it hard to get
a job when there are two many competing peers, may simply drop out of the labor
force. To capture this effect, we conduct the probit model separately for the labor
force participation decisions.
P (Laborforceij = 1) = φ(Xβ + γ1Yj + γ2Uj + εij) (3.11)
We first estimate the above two equations for all states. For the comparison of the
indirect effects of youth cohort size on the unemployment rate, we also disaggregate
the whole sample into several age groups. Moreover, we compare the estimates
obtained by including or excluding Utah in the analysis to test the outlier effect,if
any at all.
The results are reported in Table 3.8. Under each decennial census, the first and
second column present the estimates by using the data from all states and from the
states excluding Utah, respectively. The effects of youth share on the labor force
participation probability of individuals are listed in Panel A. Estimates in Panel B
show us how the youth cohort size affects the unemployment probability conditional
on the choice of labor force participation. The “Cohort Crowding” literature also
predicts that higher youth cohort size would dampen the enthusiasm of labor force
participation, since many young people would withdraw from the labor market if they
are pessimistic about finding work due to fierce competition among peers. For the age
group of 16-24 in Penal A, the significant estimates are all in negative values across
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the census years. For other age groups, the results are mixed. As shown in Panel B,
for the youngest groups with age of 16-24 and 25-34, higher youth share in the state
where the an individual lives significantly increase his probability of unemployment.
This positive effect is quite stable over the four census years which represent four
decades. Also consistent with the findings in our cross-sectional analysis by using
the aggregate data, for the oldest group between the age of 55-64, it shows that the
higher the youth cohort size, the lower the unemployment rate probability.
We also find the evidence of outlier effects by comparing the estimates from
Columns (1) and (2) for each census year. For example, when we exclude the state
of Utah from our analysis, the effect of youth share on the unemployment probability
will be much stronger.
93
4. CONCLUSION
4.1 The Slowdown of Family Migration in the United States
This paper documents a notable long-term declining trend of the family interstate
migration rate. It contributes to the migration literature in several aspects. Firstly,
we have developed a much deeper understanding about the migration trend in the
United States. Previous studies have not reached an agreement on how the migration
propensity has evolved over the past decades. Most of them focus on the overall
migration rate without appropriate disaggregation for the whole population. We
find that the aggregate interstate migration rate in the U.S. only declines modestly
over the past 40 years. There is no clear-cut trend of the overall migration rate
because of the heterogeneity in the changes of migration propensities across different
demographic groups. At the same time, the composition of the population also varies,
which further confounds the trend in the overall migration rate. Specifically, the
migration propensity of highly educated couples, especially that of the power couples,
drops so sharply that it offsets the expected increasing migration rate resulting from
the rising shares of college graduates in the population. Only based upon these
much more detailed findings could we possibly find out the fundamental reasons
that explain the change in the migration propensities for the whole economy.
Secondly, in order to explain this dramatic decline of the migration rate for the
highly educated couples, we extend Mincer’s [1978] family migration model into a
search framework. Thus we can formally model and estimate the effects of family
ties on the changing family migration propensities. To our knowledge, we make the
first attempt in the literature to measure the correlation of the gains from migra-
tion between spouses. We explicitly explore the possible sources of the gains from
94
migration. We approximate it by using the correlation of the earnings between the
husband and wife from their potential job offers. Under the assumption of uncorre-
lated error terms in the wage functions, we show that the correlation and its changes
are identified by the differentiated payoffs for different occupations across the states.
Home ownership is exogenously determined in the extended theory model. It
affects the migration probability jointly with the earnings ratio and earnings corre-
lation. Empirically, previous studies, which examine the effects of home ownership
on migration, neglect the endogeneity issue that is involved. The observed home
ownership status is endogenously determined with the migration decisions. It is un-
clear whether the owners are unlikely to move or the movers are unlikely to own.
The effects of home ownership will be overestimated if the endogeneity issue is not
addressed, even though it is correct that owning a house deters migration. In this
paper, we predict the home ownership by using state averages of housing prices,
per-capita income, mortgage rates, and property taxes, which are exogenous to the
individual family’s migration decision.
The earnings of the wife or husband are affected by their labor force participa-
tion decisions. The observed earnings in the CPS are the earnings for the previous
calendar year in which the migration occurs. It is possible that the movers quit
their jobs or stop searching for new jobs when they expect that they are going to
move in the near future. This possibility would also reduce the precision of our esti-
mates. Therefore, we calculated the predicted earnings for husband and wife under
the assumption that they will work for an average amount of time once they choose
to work. We treat the endogeniety of wife’s labor force participation in a similar
fashion.
Finally, after we test the hypothesis developed in the theory model in a base-
line logit regression, we perform a decomposition analysis for the decrease in the
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migration rate. For families with two college graduates, the increasing female labor
force participation rate and earning ratio of wife to husband explain about 60% of
the decline in the interstate migration rate in the 1980s-1990s. For families with a
college graduate, these two factors are more than sufficient to fully account for the
decrease in the migration rate. However, during the period of 1990s-2000s (prior to
2006), the rising home ownership is the primary determinant that drives down the
migration rate for both types of families. In addition to the economic factors, we
also find that the ageing population due to the end of baby boom also contributes to
the reduction in the family migration rate, since younger people have more incentive
to migrate for job opportunities and human capital enhancement.
4.2 “Cohort Crowding Effect” of Youth Share on Unemployment Rate
When we revise the literature about the impact of youth cohort size on the
unemployment rate, we find that, regardless of using a panel data across states
or countries, we couldn’t obtain consistent estimates in a fixed effect model with
the inclusion of year dummies in different time periods. The negative relationship
between youth cohort size and unemployment rate found in the U.S. data in 1978-
1996 does not show up in the post-1996 period. We also find that in the OECD data,
the inclusion of year effects reverses the positive estimates in 1971-1995 to negative
ones in 1996-2009. We attribute the inconsistency of the estimates to changes in the
correlation between the temporal variations of the unemployment rate and youth
share .
Due to the limitation of a fixed effect model with year dummies in studying this
particular problem, we focus more on the unconditional model, which could circum-
vent the issues caused by year effects. In a standard fixed effect model, variation
across sections is deleted by the inclusion of state or country dummies. Since it
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is usually difficult to verify the causality of the relationship revealed by the cross-
sectional evidence, this part of variation, which could encompass substantial infor-
mation regarding the effects of youth cohort size, is largely neglected. In this paper,
we explicitly investigate the evidence provided by this dimension of the panel data.
Through the cross-sectional analysis, we find consistent effects of the youth cohort
size on the unemployment rate in the United States. In addition, we propose an
alternative method to obtain a random sample across the years. The correlation
between the temporal variation of youth share and unemployment rate is greatly re-
duced in these constructed pseudo panels. The estimates from these pseudo panels,
which allows us to control for state fixed effects, support our cross-sectional evidence.
We demonstrate that higher youth share in the population in a state will tend to
push up the aggregate unemployment rate. This total effect encompasses both di-
rect and indirect effects. Our estimates for the indirect effects of youth cohort size
on age-group specific unemployment rate, based upon the unconditional models, are
contrary to those empirical findings in Shimer [2001], but consistent with the “cohort
crowding” literature.
The strategies proposed in this paper can hardly apply to the OECD data. Firstly,
there are only 15 countries and the sample size is too small to make any reliable
inference from an unconditional model. Secondly, there is more variation of the
unemployment rates across countries. Confounding factors, such as macroeconomic
policies, are unobservable and likely to change over time. The effects of these factors
could be mixed with that of the youth cohort size and cannot be easily captured by
the country fixed effects.
In a more comprehensive study, we would like to test the “Cohort Crowding”
effect by employing more disaggregated data across metropolitan areas or cities.
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, both the aggregate and age-group specific unem-
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ployment rate data are not available at the metropolitan area level in the United
States. But our strategy primarily relies on the identification of the indirect ef-
fects through these age-group specific unemployment rates. Moreover, even though
these data could be available in the future, there are still two challenges faced by
the economists. First, the jurisdiction of metropolitan areas varies over time, which
makes the data less comparable across time, especially in a period of several decades.
Secondly, migration across metropolitan areas is more prevalent than the migration
across states or countries, which intensifies the endogeneity problem. To instrument
the endogenous variable of youth cohort size, we also need lagged birthrates for
metropolitan areas.
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